Having worked in various West African countries during the Obama admin and witnessed our military & diplomatic footprint first hand, the collapse of the 10 year investment in countries like Chad, Burkina Faso and (especially) Niger is shocking to me.
Not only did the US invest a lot of energy and capital in these countries through USAID, MCC and OPIC, but some of our best troops rotated through these countries. The US & France even had a semi permanent base in the Niamey suburbs!
As usual the US diplomatic corps will learn no lessons and take no responsibility for this failure, but if Washington can not influence a belt of impoverished countries with broadly aligned strategic interests (anti-insurgency, economic development) even with concerted investment then how can we expect to accomplish anything meaningful in more critical theaters?
How much is our failure in the Sahel due to the somewhat intractable problems in the region, or problems with our diplomatic/military approach? Is that really proof we can't accomplish other policy objectives in critical theaters?
I think the intractable problems require a different approach. Why was something like the rebuilding of Germany and Japan successful, but Iran and Afghanistan not?
Real change probably requires a much heavier hand than we are willing to take now days.
Germany and Japan were industrialized before and had BMWs and ships before hand. It was just rebuilding.
Iraq was a petrostate where America killed all the Baa'thists who had all the institutional knowledge. It was a oil rentier state, not an industrialized country with a real social contract wit its citizens.
Afghanistan wasn't industrialized either.
It's easy to rebuild a country that was already technologically advanced and many of the entrepreneurs and investors are there to rebuild commerce. That never existed the same way in Iraq a rentier state, and Afghanistan which never had world class cars or much industry.
I'm a West African, specifically Ghanaian-American with dual citizenship. It really shouldn't be shocking. The aftermath of NATO & Arab states helping the rebels defeat Gaddafi has contributed to the current situation. After Gaddafi's fall, his Tuareg mercenaries and radical extremists affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State wreaked havoc in Mali in 2012. The Tuaregs resented Mali's oppression, while the radicals aimed to spread chaos.
Historically, Mali and Niger have oppressed their Tuareg Amazigh nomads, leading to a strong desire for secession among the Tuaregs. Gaddafi had previously supported these groups & the Malian/Nigerien governments, but after his death, radicals established bases in Libya and extended their influence into the Sahel region.
Many Americans fail to grasp the complexities of the various tribes in these countries, often reducing the dialogue to a simplistic view of Africa as a single entity. The aftermath of Gaddafi's overthrow was chaotic. We supported the rebels, who then killed Gaddafi, leaving Libya unable to form a stable government. Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi soldier and American citizen who lived in the Washington D.C. suburbs, has been a significant obstacle to a united Libya.
In 2013, France, Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), and the UN successfully dismantled the secessionist state of Azawad in Mali. However, when the militants and secessionists resorted to guerrilla warfare and spread into Niger and Burkina Faso, France faced greater challenges, and terrorism proliferated. Adding to the complexity are France's colonial legacy and Russian propaganda claiming France is recolonizing Africa. This has led to growing anti-Western sentiments among Malians, Nigeriens, and Burkinabes, who are increasingly seeking support from Russia.
Very interesting, thank you! in your opinion, what should the west have done? Not intervened in Libya? Or responded more forcefully to the rebels/IS/militias afterwards?
I think people need to take a look at themselves and really examine if humanitarian intervention or "Responsibility to Protect" is a good doctrine.
There's a few ways to look at this. But let's contextualize Libya for the readers -
Intervention in Libya was a UN-sanctioned Resolution. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973, which authorized the establishment of a no-fly zone and the use of all necessary measures to protect civilians. The whole point why UN authorized the resolution was because Gaddafi was killing protestors (some numbers say a few hundreds were killed, some say up to 10K). Regardless, because Gaddafi did slaughter protestors is what put this up for a vote in the first place. The International Community had this new doctrine called "Responsibility to Protect" after the Rwanda Genocide & Bosnian Massacre. Based on what NGOs were saying, people really thought it could escalate to a Rwanda.
America, France, UK, Bosnia, Columbia, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, and South Africa said yes.
China, Russia, Brazil, India, and Germany abstained. The key point is that none of the permanent members of the Security Council (the UK, USA, China, Russia, and France) exercised their veto power, allowing the resolution to pass and the intervention to proceed.
However, the intervention has been criticized for extending beyond the original mandate of protecting civilians to effectively supporting regime change. NATO forces provided significant support to rebel groups, which eventually led to the overthrow and killing of Gaddafi. Despite Gaddafi’s calls for a ceasefire and promises of democratic elections, the rebels were determined to remove him from power.
There are several perspectives on how the situation could have been handled differently:
1. When Gaddafi was asking for a ceasefire, NATO could have tried to pressure the rebels to stop fighting and have elections. (I don't think this would have worked since the rebels really wanted Gaddafi dead).
2. America, UK, France, China, or Russia could have used their veto (If Putin or Xi could go back in time, they would have probably used their veto. That's why China and Russia used their Veto in votes about Syria)
3. Do nothing and let things shake out on their own. Libya wasn't the only country that had issues during the Arab Spring - Bahrain also did a crackdown to restore order, people died, and Bahrain still continues. In fact, Saudi Arabia saved Bahrain. In Egypt, people protested against Mubarak. Mubarak killed hundreds of protestors but the people removed Mubarak, then Morsi was democratically elected, then the military removed him because they fucking hate the Muslim Brotherhood. Iraq killed some protestors too, no one cared.
Libya still has problems today, and its not obvious that our intervention was worth it. Terrorists still in Libya...
My understanding is that U.S. and NATO support for the rebels in early 2011 was predicated partly on the belief that the rebels needed help to avert a Gaddafi-led slaughter in Benghazi. (I'm thinking, for example, of this: https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/07/was-there-going-to-be-a-benghazi-massacre/.) Do you think that it would've been better for the U.S. and NATO to stand aside, even if doing so meant that the slaughter in Benghazi would take place?
There are two facets to consider in this complex situation:
#1: The African Union always said the intervention was wrong. (In fact Nigeria, Gabon, and South Africa broke off with the AU to support the no fly zone). The AU also tried negotiating a ceasefire and a diplomatic resolution, but the rebels turned down the AU's proposal because Gaddafi would still be in power under the proposal. The UN, NATO, EU, US, and even Nigeria, Gabon, and South Africa gave the middle finger to the AU's ability to govern to African affairs.
You can either think of this as the the international community undermining the AU. Or you can see this as the AU being a feckless institution that couldn't make a diplomatic resolution or foster unanimous diplomatic consensus among its members. Maybe the AU & regional cooperation should be heeded more since it was still a majority decision of the AU to not intervene in Libya, and the Sahel bore the brunt of the aftermath taking place right now.
#2 What you asked is basically a trolly problem. Was it better to intervene in Libya, which allowed terrorists to bring their weapons to the Sahel and kill 34K+ people and displace 3M+ people? Or is it better to let Gaddafi kill slaughter civilians where he could have killed tens of thousands? (Or it could have been a little worst than Bahrain where thousands die instead of hundreds & stability remains.). The intervention in Libya weakened many African nation's trust of the West, which is why it shouldn't surprise people when they seek anti-Western help.
To a large extent the AU's opinion, to be blunt, doesn't matter much to anyone.(To be honest, its no big loss to the West either way... Kazakhstan, Australia, Canada and a few others can sell and have more uranium than Niger. Also, Niger. Mali and Burkina faso sell gold and can barely control their gold trade.)
To be clear, we have let brutal despots still in power all the time. Because of "responsibility to protect", Libya still isn't unified while Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali are ruled by military juntas who are struggling to destroy extremists where 30K are dead, 3M displaced, and is a huge traffic source of migrants to Europe.
Hey Yaw. Thanks for your very detailed explanation. Fascinating as usual. For clarity, do you believe that without that intervention in Libya we would not be witnessing all these conflicts in the Sahel region today?
Good question, the range of plausibility is that leaving it alone could be:
1. A worst version of Bahrain/(The leaders kill hundreds and jail 1000s, but stability is restored... ),
2. A worst version of Sudan/(The leaders kill hundreds and jail 1000s, but stability is restored.. for a few more years... until 2019. ),
3. A Yemen (the strongman is removed by the rebels but then descends to civil war),
4. A worse version of Egypt (remove strongman, elect an islamist, and then military removes him with a return to pre-Arab Spring dictator)
5. A Syria repeat (a clusterfuck war that destabilizes the country)
It is my opinion that if we did nothing, it would be closer to a Bahrain or even a Sudan with a higher death toll than to a Bosnian massacre or Rwandan genocide. But at least we wouldn't have 34K+ dead, 3M displaced, and you wouldn't have migrants from there trying to risk their lives to Europe. We have left strongmen in place many times
It's not... France & UN have been in Mali for ~10 years (and the other countries Chad, BF, and Niger) a little less and they couldn't kill all the terrorists. America had a $100M reaper drone base in Niger and the terrorism has just gotten worse. It's like an Afghanistan. Plus you have the rebels.
Mali and Niger are mainly desert.
Russia will figure out soon that this isn't that easy.
Why assume that we even can influence things that way? I think one of the big lessons we should have learned from the last 50 years is that no matter our desire or our resources, we don't really have an ability to shape events in far flung areas of the world.
That doesn't mean we should become isolationist or make no efforts, but we should remain both humble and skeptical about our abilities to get other people to act either in our interests or in even parallel with how we would see as the rational action.
My personal opinion is that we overlearned the lessons of the Bush administration being inflexibly overcommitted to certain outcomes. Now we face the opposite problem where we are somewhere between passive and indecisive in our approach to events.
Given the integration of JSOTF-TS at high levels of these partner militaries there must have been some sense of the discontent brewing in these countries. I understand that the options available to the United States are unpalatable - either support the plotters or attempt to foment a counter-coup - but doing nothing and letting the chips fall is also a choice. Then for us to throw up our hands and say "well we have rules that prevent us from doing business with coup plotters so I guess we'll just bail on the region" while Egypt is sitting there staring you in the face is embarrassing. Giving up and slinking away may even be the correct choice, but in that case we should not have treated the region as strategically important in the first place or should have some sense of why it isn't strategically important anymore. I don't think there is any movement to curtail or reduce MCC Compacts or Power Africa investments in the region, for example.
I don't think there's any evidence that Trump specifically caused any erosion in the US position in the region (diplomatic and military budgets rose significantly while he was in office) but I do think the 2017 ambush in Niger probably limited US Forces' ability to operate in country. Regardless, these were surmountable obstacles & US/French ability to project power in the region greatly exceeds Russian capabilities. The US is leaving because it wasn't worth it to stick around. Generally speaking it pains me to see so many brilliant people work so hard (and spend so much money) on a subject that Foggy Bottom & the White House (under 3 admins) obviously really didn't care about.
I visited Ethiopia for ten days in 2019, and I have to say I was shocked that several Ethiopian people engaged me in conversation about politics and were pro-Trump. My best understanding of why was that they were very upset about what happened in Libya under Obama (although it may have also been somewhat attributable to Ethiopia being very culturally conservative). So my very limited exposure to a country in the region confirms Yaw's contention that Gaddafi's fall was destabilizing and provided an opening for anti-American actors. Much as I despise Trump, I don't think he owns this chaos.
"I feel like nearly everyone here, were they in Obama’s shoes, would have taken out Qaddafi."
It wasn't necessarily the wrong move to take him out, but when we do such things, we have to have a solid plan for the aftermath and a real commitment to that country. If you break it, you own it. And that leads to all kinds of trouble, of course (Exhibit A: Afghanistan), so it behooves us to proceed with extreme caution when we decide to take out a tyrannical regime. It seems that opening the region up to warlordism was a step backward from dictatorship.
I want to be clear: At the time, I was in favor of what Obama did. It's only since then that I've concluded that he made a terrible error.
As for blaming Trump for everything...It's a fun joke, but seems to be the fallback position for many people who oppose him. It's a counterproductive tactic.
That was my thought, too. He spent four whole years selling out our foreign policy and decimating State.
It wouldn't be surprising that, amid his flashier corruptions, he might have ALSO been fomenting chaos in the "shithole countries" to try and extort their leaders for cash. It's exactly the sort of low-rent racket he's famous for -- preying on the weakest, rather than swinging for the fences.
The Libyan intervention happened in 2011, during the Obama administration. I don't really blame Obama though. Hilary and Obama really thought Gaddafi was genocidal. No one in the security council vetoed the decision:
That said the destruction of Libya brought cascading effects to the Sahel. Weapon smuggling was rampant since terrorists just took those weapons to rampage.
Libya's trajectory could have been markedly different. Perhaps we should have taken Gaddafi's ceasefire proposal seriously, seeking to halt the rebel advance and initiate a path towards democratic elections. Alternatively, we could have opted for non-intervention.
Admittedly, neither of these choices guaranteed success. Even if the UN had urged the rebels to spare Gaddafi, they might have pursued his demise, albeit with greater difficulty without NATO's support. There's a grim possibility that Gaddafi's regime would have resorted to extreme measures, resulting in a staggering death toll, one I'd prefer not to contemplate.
Nevertheless, a stable Libya could have translated into stability across the Sahel. Countries like Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali might not have faced the same extent of extremist violence had weapons not flowed unchecked through Libyan borders.
Thanks Matt. I imagine you had to do quite a bit of research and wrapping your mind around the situation to be able to synthesize it. I honestly had no idea what was going on in the region.
In the best sense! Not a, "This is what you should believe and here's why", but a genuine "Here's what's going on, WITHOUT the MSM sensationalization or ignorant grievance-peddling Faux News BS".
I've written about the economic and geopolitical histories of various African countries, spanning from pre-colonial times to the present day. While I haven't published my article on Sudan yet, I have covered Niger and Chad in a multi-part series.
Mali and Niger are grappling with internal issues, including the secessionist ambitions of the nomadic Tuareg Amazigh, corruption, weak governance, and pervasive poverty(They are both agrarian societies with terrible agricultural productivity). Externally, they face threats from jihadists affiliated with Al-Qaeda (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and JMIN) and the Islamic State (Islamic State in the Greater Sahara). The extremist problem initially emerged after the Algerian Civil War ended in 2002, but it exploded following the Libyan Civil War, drawing more jihadists to the Sahel region around Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Chad has also been dealing with extremists in the aftermath of the First Libyan Civil War.
Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso have shifted from relying on France to seeking military support from Russia. They perceive France as ineffective in combating guerrilla fighters, despite a decade of French assistance. While France successfully dismantled the secessionist Azawad state in Mali in 2013 during Operation Serval, its efforts against guerrilla fighters in Operation Barkhane were less effective. After nearly a decade of French involvement, local populations began to view France as a neocolonial power. Consequently, the coup leaders garnered popular support by removing French and Western influence.
Involvement can clearly be a range of things. Completely ceding the region to murderous dictators and the Wagner group doesn't seem like the right strategy to me.
What *REALISTIC* options exist that do not involve either murderous dictators or chaos/anarchy?
I mean, the reason this is so depressing is that, looking at the history of the region, after the fall of colonialism you seem to have nothing but a string of "Dictator A takes over and oppresses his people horribly, Wannabe Dictator B attempts a coup, there's a rebellion/civil war during which innocent people suffer horribly, Dictator B wins and turns out just as bad and oppressive as Dictator A, wash, rinse, repeat, with extra oppression and suffering" occasionally relieved by "a democratically elected leader manages to take power for a couple years before being overthrown in a coup, go back to Square 1."
I am 100% in favor of helping ordinary people who suffer, and I feel terribly sorry for them, but trying to pick winners between evil Dictator A and equally evil Rebel Leader B seems like a no-win game, and as anyone familiar with the movie "War Games" knows, the only way to win a no-win game is not to play.
"What *REALISTIC* options exist that do not involve either murderous dictators or chaos/anarchy?"
The International Crisis Group is a think-tank set up in the 1990s (*) to provide detailed background information and recommendations to policymakers when a humanitarian crisis is imminent or in progress. They have some recommendations on Sudan.
"The U.S., Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE – outside parties that wield significant leverage over the warring parties – have the best chances of persuading the two sides to stop fighting, allow humanitarian aid to reach those who need it and begin the hard work of knitting Sudan back together. The alternative is grim to contemplate, as the country teeters on the brink of chaos, mass starvation and a war that could spread across its borders to a troubled region. Time is of the essence – particularly since the parties are inveigling new warlords to join the fight with promises that they will share in victory’s eventual spoils, which promises to make negotiations to end the war that much more difficult.
"Against this backdrop, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are intent on reconvening talks in Jeddah. The new round should broaden to include roles for Egypt and the UAE, as Crisis Group has long argued, as well as for the new envoys from the AU, UN and IGAD, given the opportunity for reinvigorated diplomacy afforded by these appointments. A single consolidated negotiation process would allow for greater and more cohesive foreign pressure on the two sides, while closing avenues for the belligerents to continue forum shopping to evade serious negotiations. These talks should also expressly aim to reach an urgent permanent ceasefire, instead of dwelling on confidence-building measures as previously. If plans to turn the Jeddah talks into a high-level forum for ceasefire talks falter, then key actors (especially the U.S. and UN) should find a way to make the various negotiation tracks reinforce rather than undermine each other. Advancing as nimbly and quickly as possible toward a deal, using both informal and formal channels and steadily intensifying pressure on the sides should be the goal, no matter where talks take place.
"At the same time, moves to spare millions of Sudanese from starvation cannot wait. All those with influence on the conflict parties should prevail on them in public and private to allow unfettered food aid to communities in need. Outside powers should explore other options for getting food into the worst-affected areas of the country, including greater Darfur, if the warring leaders remain uncooperative. Donors should look into funnelling funds through local volunteers, particularly in the Khartoum, Darfur, Kordofan and Gezira areas, where millions are languishing after nearly all the major aid organisations fled. Donors should also stand ready to reach into their coffers to support the gravely underfunded aid response."
Unsure if there is an entirely correct strategy here and I don't have the knowledge base to craft the best one here. Conceptually, I'm just in favor of the US maintaining geopolitical influence in Africa, rather than ceding that ground to the Wagner group or China.
The words of the proverbial generic American who opens the paper, says “Wow, looks like a mess”, and closes the paper, the better to not see or hear the terrible things in the world, and imagines not hearing about them and not being “involved” in them, taking comfort in the broad wide oceans on either side of him, will make them disappear.
Matt himself used to vibe that way at times. I recall him mildly celebrating Russia’s growing displacement of US power in the Middle East years ago, arguing essentially “Well now THEY get to be the ones tangled up in the region; sucks to be them.”
He appears to be evolving on that, along with events. It’s one of the reasons I read him. Even if some of his audience doesn’t, or evolves in the opposite direction.
The benefit of being a superpower is ... well, the whole super powerful part. But it means we can't ignore bad things happening around the world as easily as a lesser power can do.
Given how the rest of the world largely doesn't seem to appreciate America's continued sacrifices here I'm of the opinion we should largely step back and let the rest of the world solve their problems as we focus on growth and prosperity at home.
I’m not isolationist, but I do admit there is an element of “damned if we do, damned if we don’t “ here.
Get involved? We will be accused of neocolonialism and blamed for anything that goes wrong, and a grumpy blogger will comment on how America is the GrEaTeSt sOuRcE of EviL in the world.
Don’t get involved? We’re a bunch of racists who don’t care about Black people getting killed, and/or naive fools who don’t understand the geopolitical implications. Sigh.
America’s growth and prosperity relies on open seas and if we let CCP’s imperialism go unchecked we are creating a world with markets closed to the U.S.
This might be overstated. While I'm not sure how I feel about Allan's position in general, it doesn't seem to me that our national prosperity relies on us continuing our current, highly interventionist, policy to try and preserve all existing market access.
Trade with Africa specifically is a small and shrinking share of our gdp.
More generally, we're not North Korea. The US domestic market is very large, making us less reliant on trade than most. This paper estimates an expected loss of 2%-8% of US gdp in a world with pure US autarky. (The paper also notes that this is interestingly similar to prior estimates of the effect size of the Jeffersonian embargo of 1807 and pre-Meiji Japanese autarky.)
We could eat a loss of that magnitude and still be substantially richer than just about everyone.
But, if that still sounds like too much to risk, I would note that there's no plausible case where a future imperial China is able to interdict US trade with Canada and Mexico, and it's hard to imagine even dramatic inhibition of our trade with Europe. And due to diminishing marginal returns, each trade partner we are able to preserve represents an outsized fraction of the benefits of trade generally.
So, the expected economic costs of more isolationism don't seem particularly weighty.
I suppose as long as the US isn’t too concerned about the price of oil, maybe not…but when have we ever not been too concerned about the price of oil? Domestic production might be sufficient to meet our needs, but the price is still set on world markets that can be disrupted by a war between major oil producers. Maybe the best argument for accelerating “green energy” is the possibility of not having to care about the Saudis or Iran.
I agree…there is an odd paradox that when a country like the US is at its most powerful in terms of ability to influence the world…that influence is less valuable. As the country faces more challenges and is less able to influence events is also when that influence is most important.
I think the benefits of being a superpower is being able to pick and choose what conflicts we actually want to be a part of. One thing I think America has sorely lacked in the last 50 years is the ability to prioritize. If America wants to weaken Russia’s grip in Africa, then the easiest way is to give Ukraine all of the weapons they could possibly want.
In my opinion, Russia can keep Syria; they're welcome to it. I wouldn't have us switch places with them for the world.
My view of America's place in the world is very simple. There are parts of the world that are incredibly important economically, socially etc and we have to be deeply involved in them to help keep the peace and maintain global prosperity: the Indo-Pacific region and Europe. And then there are places in our neighborhood that, because we are the dominant power and our long history, we have an interest in helping succeed and keeping peaceful: Central and South America (well, Canada too).
Other than those areas, we should get involved only to the extent that it is virtually costless and risk-free for us. Otherwise, wish them the best and both sides go on their way.
I don't think Matt is really so indifferent as he seems. I think the flippant comment is more about debunking the idea that miltary interventionism is about self-interest. The same Russian nationalist who thinks this is a good idea is the same person who can articulate exactly why the US intervention in Iraq was so self-destructive.
But that doesn't mean there is nothing humanitarianly productive we can do in the region, it just means we should fool ourselves into think "we need our guy in Sudan to seize the initiative in the Middle East" or whatever the imagined US interest would be.
His flippancy seemed to be more a 2021 thing, honestly.
Back then, a lot of otherwise far-seeing center-left pundits (Matt actually not being nearly the worst on this front) were anticipating/hoping with baited breath for a future world where the US could focus on child tax credits, housing policy, health care, and all kinds of lovely domestic priorities.
Matt himself got into a roaring Twitter fight back then with Michael McFaul, of all people, basically calling him a liar (about aspects of US foreign policy toward Russia, specifically). I still remember the Slow Boring article condemning America's "militaristic" policy regarding Ukraine--in January 2022.
Wild time, that.
I bring all this crud up not to ding Matt, specifically. If anything, his (generally very good) analysis and takes nowadays show his keen sense of what's important and real, and how changeable true liberals are in the face of changing reality around the world.
I bring it up, essentially, to point out the old maxim--Whether or not Americans are interested in the world, the world, from Ukraine and Taiwan to Syria and Sudan--is very much interested in us.
We look for excuses to back away from it at our peril. My two cents.
I mean, it is fine to argue which things we should be involved in, and if you think this is one of them, make that case.
But a dogmatic 'It is our duty to make all problems disappear, rather than to ignore them' philosophy is obvious nonsense. You must pick and choose.
Also, strawman. Just because the "proverbial generic American" wishes to ignore a thing, does not mean that they are stupid enough to believe that their ignorance will "make them disappear".
Did i mischaracterize this paragraph somehow? Is this NOT implying that we are morally obligated to care about, and "get involved in" all the "terrible things in the world"? That is the implication that I refute, and it is hardly a strawman. That is, in fact, obvious nonsense.
"The words of the proverbial generic American who opens the paper, says “Wow, looks like a mess”, and closes the paper, the better to not see or hear the terrible things in the world, and imagines not hearing about them and not being “involved” in them, taking comfort in the broad wide oceans on either side of him, will make them disappear."
If that isn't what you meant to imply, speak more clearly.
Priorities are a thing. Even cosmopolitans have to make a case that the RoI for intervening in Sudan is better than alternative uses of our attention and resources. Sudan is far away and apparently has a lot of complicated and seemingly intractable problems.
But we shouldn't pretended that resources are unlimited either. I don't know enough about Sudan to know whether it's worth it or not or what the costs are.
I mean, you say it isn't smart, but if you trained a parrot to say just that one phrase and had it travel around every room in Washington where foreign policy is discussed, its record would be about 80% better than the average cable news talking head, and 99% better than Lindsey Graham.
Right. It's actually true that the US doesn't have to be involved everywhere and the notion that it does is a very contested and contestable ideology with a spotty track record, not a self-evident truth.
Unfortunately, it's harder for people to be concerned about a war where two warlords are using a country as their playground for power. Without an "oppressor-oppressed" narrative or a clear "good guy," it's more difficult for people to support a side.
For those who believe "America shouldn't be involved in every conflict," Sudan serves as a poignant example. When America doesn't take a commanding role, middle powers step in to fill the vacuum. Americans must decide if they are comfortable with that. Of course, more nuanced discernment mechanisms are at play.
Similarly, there's the largely ignored decade-long civil war in the Central African Republic, right beneath Sudan and Chad. You can explore more about this conflict in the economic history of the Central African Republic here.
The UN is a lame duck, it can't lead an intervention without Russia's consent, which it won't.
Siding with either side means accepting their atrocities. Unilaterally attacking either one, or even both, even if it's just a bunch of airstrikes might change the balance of power, but could just as easily lead to more chaos and atrocities. Decapitation strikes are likewise frowned upon and prone to chaos as well.
Pretty much the only thing left is the boring diplomatic solution, which takes too long, is frustratingly opaque as to whether it's actually working -- in fact, it won't look like it's working until it finally DOES -- and requires us to rely on an absolutely depleted State Department.
I'm definitely not trying to pooh-pooh you here; I personally HATE when all a person does is shoot ideas down and not contribute any of their own. But I'm genuinely curious if you see a viable solution path here.
I didn't give an opinion either way. But my stance is America is doing the right thing by not choosing a side and by choosing the boring diplomatic resolution.
By not choosing a side, middle powers will support their side and there will be more deaths, but if America interferes, the regime that wins will look illegitimate and look like a US puppet.
I think America is at its best when it doesn't intervene directly.
Indeed, I think that America’s role should always be the balancing power and never the direct interventionist except for crucial conflicts that directly affect its interest
In 2008, I was in South Sudan less than a year after the peace agreement with the North (eg the Khartoum government). I previously knew nothing about the Sudanese civil war - I was just there working with a global health contractor firm on a brand-new USAID project. Got up to speed quickly. I learned that close to a million people had died in the Sudanese civil war in the last few decades, and my mind swam that absolutely no one in the U.S. knew or even cared.
I spent a lot of time with our country director. One night, she mentioned to me that she slept with her loaded AK-47 under her bed. I asked... why? She shrugged. "So when war comes again, we will be ready."
"Do you think war will come again?"
She smirked. "Yes. And then we will kill them, and then kill their children, just like they did to us."
That really stuck with me.
I spent a lot of time working in Africa. The vast majority of the continent is nothing like Sudan. But most Americans dismiss pretty much all of it, and certainly the Sudanese conflict, in a way they would never do to, say, what happens in central Asia or the Middle East, and it's hard to see it once you realize it.
Antony Blinken, the Secretary of State, was in Kyiv this week. One stop was to play guitar in a local bar. No, I'm not kidding.
We've been so scarred by Trump's incompetence that we can't quite accept that the Biden Administration's foreign policy hasn't been effective. Yes, they are trying hard and face some difficult situations. But it hasn't been effective at avoiding escalations in almost every part of the world -- Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Iranian-backed Hamas attack on Israel, Houthis shutting down shipping in the Red Sea, what Matt describes today in Sudan and increasing tensions (thankfully not yet acted upon) between China and Taiwan. The NATO states like us better and the Administration says all the right things but I'm disappointed with the results.
Whenever we get into disappointment with Biden admin foreign policy, I have to bring up the counterfactual. Do any of the situations you describe above strike you as being better off on Earth 2 where Trump won a second term? I've detailed this in other comments, but the counterfactuals on Ukraine, Hamas/Gaza, Houthis, all would probably me more strategically favorable to our adversaries than the situation stands today, since Trump's foreign policy consisted largely of taking the US off the board and allowing the new Axis to establish their spheres on influence.
That world might look more "peaceful" but largely because we would not be backing any allies in the fight. The bad guys would still probably have gained more than they have in reality.
I think the disappointment you (and frankly I) feel is largely disappointment with the accelerating final unraveling of the unipolar moment. It sucks that the US can't keep a lid on things unilaterally anymore. The strategic way out is to revitalize alliances in Europe and the Pacific, which is something the Biden admin has been fairly successful at doing. Failure to do so will lose us Cold War 2.
I'll preface this by saying that I know basically nothing about foreign policy. But forget even comparing to the Trump administration. What could or should the Biden admin have done to prevent these things from happening? It's not like there is a "keep Russia from invading Ukraine" button that Biden could have pressed but didn't.
I'm disappointed in what's happening around the world too, but I think the Biden admin is doing the best that they can
Yeah, I'm very sympathetic to John's disappointment (I'm sort of disappointed too), but this seems to come back to other actors having agency.
To pick one, Putin made a catastrophically terrible decision, and there's only so much more you could have made his options catastrophically terrible-r.
Also, Trump depleted a lot of our state capacity... literally, at State. And in the military and elsewhere. That was 4 years we could have been ACTUALLY catching up on industrial capacity, but instead fell behind.
Yeah, I'm struck by the fact that given Putin pretty clearly was planning to invade Ukraine for years (everything with Paul Manafort and his shenanigans in 2016 I think have to be seen in this light), I'd say the Ukraine war has gone as "well" as could possibly have been expected.
Now I put "well" in quotes because I'm being very relative here. Of course, the best outcome is no war at all; I'm very aware there are already over 100K dead (depending on reports on Russian military deaths) and I've seen the videos and pictures of devastation on the ground. But again, I feel fairly certain in saying that no matter who was President, Putin was determined to invade. So given that reality, I'm not sure anyone is doing better than Biden in this situation.
The most consequential thing for Ukraine was Democrats failing to hold a few more seats in 2022. Nothing could have prevented the invasion and Biden responded exactly correctly. The battlefield situation would be better if the flow of arms hadn't been interrupted for months.
Having worked in various West African countries during the Obama admin and witnessed our military & diplomatic footprint first hand, the collapse of the 10 year investment in countries like Chad, Burkina Faso and (especially) Niger is shocking to me.
Not only did the US invest a lot of energy and capital in these countries through USAID, MCC and OPIC, but some of our best troops rotated through these countries. The US & France even had a semi permanent base in the Niamey suburbs!
As usual the US diplomatic corps will learn no lessons and take no responsibility for this failure, but if Washington can not influence a belt of impoverished countries with broadly aligned strategic interests (anti-insurgency, economic development) even with concerted investment then how can we expect to accomplish anything meaningful in more critical theaters?
How much is our failure in the Sahel due to the somewhat intractable problems in the region, or problems with our diplomatic/military approach? Is that really proof we can't accomplish other policy objectives in critical theaters?
I think the intractable problems require a different approach. Why was something like the rebuilding of Germany and Japan successful, but Iran and Afghanistan not?
Real change probably requires a much heavier hand than we are willing to take now days.
Germany and Japan were industrialized before and had BMWs and ships before hand. It was just rebuilding.
Iraq was a petrostate where America killed all the Baa'thists who had all the institutional knowledge. It was a oil rentier state, not an industrialized country with a real social contract wit its citizens.
Afghanistan wasn't industrialized either.
It's easy to rebuild a country that was already technologically advanced and many of the entrepreneurs and investors are there to rebuild commerce. That never existed the same way in Iraq a rentier state, and Afghanistan which never had world class cars or much industry.
I'm a West African, specifically Ghanaian-American with dual citizenship. It really shouldn't be shocking. The aftermath of NATO & Arab states helping the rebels defeat Gaddafi has contributed to the current situation. After Gaddafi's fall, his Tuareg mercenaries and radical extremists affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State wreaked havoc in Mali in 2012. The Tuaregs resented Mali's oppression, while the radicals aimed to spread chaos.
Historically, Mali and Niger have oppressed their Tuareg Amazigh nomads, leading to a strong desire for secession among the Tuaregs. Gaddafi had previously supported these groups & the Malian/Nigerien governments, but after his death, radicals established bases in Libya and extended their influence into the Sahel region.
Many Americans fail to grasp the complexities of the various tribes in these countries, often reducing the dialogue to a simplistic view of Africa as a single entity. The aftermath of Gaddafi's overthrow was chaotic. We supported the rebels, who then killed Gaddafi, leaving Libya unable to form a stable government. Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi soldier and American citizen who lived in the Washington D.C. suburbs, has been a significant obstacle to a united Libya.
In 2013, France, Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), and the UN successfully dismantled the secessionist state of Azawad in Mali. However, when the militants and secessionists resorted to guerrilla warfare and spread into Niger and Burkina Faso, France faced greater challenges, and terrorism proliferated. Adding to the complexity are France's colonial legacy and Russian propaganda claiming France is recolonizing Africa. This has led to growing anti-Western sentiments among Malians, Nigeriens, and Burkinabes, who are increasingly seeking support from Russia.
Very interesting, thank you! in your opinion, what should the west have done? Not intervened in Libya? Or responded more forcefully to the rebels/IS/militias afterwards?
I think people need to take a look at themselves and really examine if humanitarian intervention or "Responsibility to Protect" is a good doctrine.
There's a few ways to look at this. But let's contextualize Libya for the readers -
Intervention in Libya was a UN-sanctioned Resolution. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973, which authorized the establishment of a no-fly zone and the use of all necessary measures to protect civilians. The whole point why UN authorized the resolution was because Gaddafi was killing protestors (some numbers say a few hundreds were killed, some say up to 10K). Regardless, because Gaddafi did slaughter protestors is what put this up for a vote in the first place. The International Community had this new doctrine called "Responsibility to Protect" after the Rwanda Genocide & Bosnian Massacre. Based on what NGOs were saying, people really thought it could escalate to a Rwanda.
America, France, UK, Bosnia, Columbia, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, and South Africa said yes.
China, Russia, Brazil, India, and Germany abstained. The key point is that none of the permanent members of the Security Council (the UK, USA, China, Russia, and France) exercised their veto power, allowing the resolution to pass and the intervention to proceed.
However, the intervention has been criticized for extending beyond the original mandate of protecting civilians to effectively supporting regime change. NATO forces provided significant support to rebel groups, which eventually led to the overthrow and killing of Gaddafi. Despite Gaddafi’s calls for a ceasefire and promises of democratic elections, the rebels were determined to remove him from power.
There are several perspectives on how the situation could have been handled differently:
1. When Gaddafi was asking for a ceasefire, NATO could have tried to pressure the rebels to stop fighting and have elections. (I don't think this would have worked since the rebels really wanted Gaddafi dead).
2. America, UK, France, China, or Russia could have used their veto (If Putin or Xi could go back in time, they would have probably used their veto. That's why China and Russia used their Veto in votes about Syria)
3. Do nothing and let things shake out on their own. Libya wasn't the only country that had issues during the Arab Spring - Bahrain also did a crackdown to restore order, people died, and Bahrain still continues. In fact, Saudi Arabia saved Bahrain. In Egypt, people protested against Mubarak. Mubarak killed hundreds of protestors but the people removed Mubarak, then Morsi was democratically elected, then the military removed him because they fucking hate the Muslim Brotherhood. Iraq killed some protestors too, no one cared.
Libya still has problems today, and its not obvious that our intervention was worth it. Terrorists still in Libya...
My understanding is that U.S. and NATO support for the rebels in early 2011 was predicated partly on the belief that the rebels needed help to avert a Gaddafi-led slaughter in Benghazi. (I'm thinking, for example, of this: https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/07/was-there-going-to-be-a-benghazi-massacre/.) Do you think that it would've been better for the U.S. and NATO to stand aside, even if doing so meant that the slaughter in Benghazi would take place?
There are two facets to consider in this complex situation:
#1: The African Union always said the intervention was wrong. (In fact Nigeria, Gabon, and South Africa broke off with the AU to support the no fly zone). The AU also tried negotiating a ceasefire and a diplomatic resolution, but the rebels turned down the AU's proposal because Gaddafi would still be in power under the proposal. The UN, NATO, EU, US, and even Nigeria, Gabon, and South Africa gave the middle finger to the AU's ability to govern to African affairs.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/4/11/libyan-rebels-reject-african-union-peace-plan
You can either think of this as the the international community undermining the AU. Or you can see this as the AU being a feckless institution that couldn't make a diplomatic resolution or foster unanimous diplomatic consensus among its members. Maybe the AU & regional cooperation should be heeded more since it was still a majority decision of the AU to not intervene in Libya, and the Sahel bore the brunt of the aftermath taking place right now.
#2 What you asked is basically a trolly problem. Was it better to intervene in Libya, which allowed terrorists to bring their weapons to the Sahel and kill 34K+ people and displace 3M+ people? Or is it better to let Gaddafi kill slaughter civilians where he could have killed tens of thousands? (Or it could have been a little worst than Bahrain where thousands die instead of hundreds & stability remains.). The intervention in Libya weakened many African nation's trust of the West, which is why it shouldn't surprise people when they seek anti-Western help.
To a large extent the AU's opinion, to be blunt, doesn't matter much to anyone.(To be honest, its no big loss to the West either way... Kazakhstan, Australia, Canada and a few others can sell and have more uranium than Niger. Also, Niger. Mali and Burkina faso sell gold and can barely control their gold trade.)
To be clear, we have let brutal despots still in power all the time. Because of "responsibility to protect", Libya still isn't unified while Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali are ruled by military juntas who are struggling to destroy extremists where 30K are dead, 3M displaced, and is a huge traffic source of migrants to Europe.
Hey Yaw. Thanks for your very detailed explanation. Fascinating as usual. For clarity, do you believe that without that intervention in Libya we would not be witnessing all these conflicts in the Sahel region today?
Good question, the range of plausibility is that leaving it alone could be:
1. A worst version of Bahrain/(The leaders kill hundreds and jail 1000s, but stability is restored... ),
2. A worst version of Sudan/(The leaders kill hundreds and jail 1000s, but stability is restored.. for a few more years... until 2019. ),
3. A Yemen (the strongman is removed by the rebels but then descends to civil war),
4. A worse version of Egypt (remove strongman, elect an islamist, and then military removes him with a return to pre-Arab Spring dictator)
5. A Syria repeat (a clusterfuck war that destabilizes the country)
It is my opinion that if we did nothing, it would be closer to a Bahrain or even a Sudan with a higher death toll than to a Bosnian massacre or Rwandan genocide. But at least we wouldn't have 34K+ dead, 3M displaced, and you wouldn't have migrants from there trying to risk their lives to Europe. We have left strongmen in place many times
Thanks for the post…very helpful context!
Correct! In this case Rebels means the terrorists & secessionists.
It's not... France & UN have been in Mali for ~10 years (and the other countries Chad, BF, and Niger) a little less and they couldn't kill all the terrorists. America had a $100M reaper drone base in Niger and the terrorism has just gotten worse. It's like an Afghanistan. Plus you have the rebels.
Mali and Niger are mainly desert.
Russia will figure out soon that this isn't that easy.
Why assume that we even can influence things that way? I think one of the big lessons we should have learned from the last 50 years is that no matter our desire or our resources, we don't really have an ability to shape events in far flung areas of the world.
That doesn't mean we should become isolationist or make no efforts, but we should remain both humble and skeptical about our abilities to get other people to act either in our interests or in even parallel with how we would see as the rational action.
Disagree. I think we can. But we have to understand the cost, be willing to make tough choices and commit the resources
Edmund Burke.
Very interesting. What do you think the US should have done differently? Genuinely asking.
My personal opinion is that we overlearned the lessons of the Bush administration being inflexibly overcommitted to certain outcomes. Now we face the opposite problem where we are somewhere between passive and indecisive in our approach to events.
Given the integration of JSOTF-TS at high levels of these partner militaries there must have been some sense of the discontent brewing in these countries. I understand that the options available to the United States are unpalatable - either support the plotters or attempt to foment a counter-coup - but doing nothing and letting the chips fall is also a choice. Then for us to throw up our hands and say "well we have rules that prevent us from doing business with coup plotters so I guess we'll just bail on the region" while Egypt is sitting there staring you in the face is embarrassing. Giving up and slinking away may even be the correct choice, but in that case we should not have treated the region as strategically important in the first place or should have some sense of why it isn't strategically important anymore. I don't think there is any movement to curtail or reduce MCC Compacts or Power Africa investments in the region, for example.
I don't think there's any evidence that Trump specifically caused any erosion in the US position in the region (diplomatic and military budgets rose significantly while he was in office) but I do think the 2017 ambush in Niger probably limited US Forces' ability to operate in country. Regardless, these were surmountable obstacles & US/French ability to project power in the region greatly exceeds Russian capabilities. The US is leaving because it wasn't worth it to stick around. Generally speaking it pains me to see so many brilliant people work so hard (and spend so much money) on a subject that Foggy Bottom & the White House (under 3 admins) obviously really didn't care about.
And a second question is how much this erosion is attributed to the Trump administration?
I visited Ethiopia for ten days in 2019, and I have to say I was shocked that several Ethiopian people engaged me in conversation about politics and were pro-Trump. My best understanding of why was that they were very upset about what happened in Libya under Obama (although it may have also been somewhat attributable to Ethiopia being very culturally conservative). So my very limited exposure to a country in the region confirms Yaw's contention that Gaddafi's fall was destabilizing and provided an opening for anti-American actors. Much as I despise Trump, I don't think he owns this chaos.
"I feel like nearly everyone here, were they in Obama’s shoes, would have taken out Qaddafi."
It wasn't necessarily the wrong move to take him out, but when we do such things, we have to have a solid plan for the aftermath and a real commitment to that country. If you break it, you own it. And that leads to all kinds of trouble, of course (Exhibit A: Afghanistan), so it behooves us to proceed with extreme caution when we decide to take out a tyrannical regime. It seems that opening the region up to warlordism was a step backward from dictatorship.
I want to be clear: At the time, I was in favor of what Obama did. It's only since then that I've concluded that he made a terrible error.
As for blaming Trump for everything...It's a fun joke, but seems to be the fallback position for many people who oppose him. It's a counterproductive tactic.
"I feel like it’s pretty important for everyone to blame Trump for 100% of the country’s woes"
Thus proving Trumpists right?
Exactly. Ask the Kurds after 2019.
Rebels everywhere have to be asking themselves if Russia isn't a more stable ally than chancing another Trump or Trump-lite US president's whims.
seems like allies are asking them same after Biden abandoned Afghanistan
Umm, Trump abandoned Afghanistan.
Biden orders the withdrawal.
That was my thought, too. He spent four whole years selling out our foreign policy and decimating State.
It wouldn't be surprising that, amid his flashier corruptions, he might have ALSO been fomenting chaos in the "shithole countries" to try and extort their leaders for cash. It's exactly the sort of low-rent racket he's famous for -- preying on the weakest, rather than swinging for the fences.
The Libyan intervention happened in 2011, during the Obama administration. I don't really blame Obama though. Hilary and Obama really thought Gaddafi was genocidal. No one in the security council vetoed the decision:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1973
That said the destruction of Libya brought cascading effects to the Sahel. Weapon smuggling was rampant since terrorists just took those weapons to rampage.
Libya's trajectory could have been markedly different. Perhaps we should have taken Gaddafi's ceasefire proposal seriously, seeking to halt the rebel advance and initiate a path towards democratic elections. Alternatively, we could have opted for non-intervention.
Admittedly, neither of these choices guaranteed success. Even if the UN had urged the rebels to spare Gaddafi, they might have pursued his demise, albeit with greater difficulty without NATO's support. There's a grim possibility that Gaddafi's regime would have resorted to extreme measures, resulting in a staggering death toll, one I'd prefer not to contemplate.
Nevertheless, a stable Libya could have translated into stability across the Sahel. Countries like Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali might not have faced the same extent of extremist violence had weapons not flowed unchecked through Libyan borders.
>>As usual the US diplomatic corps will learn no lessons and take no responsibility for this failure
I mean, they were kind of famously hollowed out by Trump. It's not surprising that these sorts of collapses might follow.
Thanks Matt. I imagine you had to do quite a bit of research and wrapping your mind around the situation to be able to synthesize it. I honestly had no idea what was going on in the region.
Agreed, it was a classic Vox explainer.
In the best sense! Not a, "This is what you should believe and here's why", but a genuine "Here's what's going on, WITHOUT the MSM sensationalization or ignorant grievance-peddling Faux News BS".
Would love to have more of these.
Yes this was a good and informative piece.
Agreed.
Learned a lot. I really appreciate the piece.
Great article.
I've written about the economic and geopolitical histories of various African countries, spanning from pre-colonial times to the present day. While I haven't published my article on Sudan yet, I have covered Niger and Chad in a multi-part series.
Mali and Niger are grappling with internal issues, including the secessionist ambitions of the nomadic Tuareg Amazigh, corruption, weak governance, and pervasive poverty(They are both agrarian societies with terrible agricultural productivity). Externally, they face threats from jihadists affiliated with Al-Qaeda (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and JMIN) and the Islamic State (Islamic State in the Greater Sahara). The extremist problem initially emerged after the Algerian Civil War ended in 2002, but it exploded following the Libyan Civil War, drawing more jihadists to the Sahel region around Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Chad has also been dealing with extremists in the aftermath of the First Libyan Civil War.
Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso have shifted from relying on France to seeking military support from Russia. They perceive France as ineffective in combating guerrilla fighters, despite a decade of French assistance. While France successfully dismantled the secessionist Azawad state in Mali in 2013 during Operation Serval, its efforts against guerrilla fighters in Operation Barkhane were less effective. After nearly a decade of French involvement, local populations began to view France as a neocolonial power. Consequently, the coup leaders garnered popular support by removing French and Western influence.
Niger Series: https://open.substack.com/pub/yawboadu/p/nigers-modern-economic-and-geopolitical?r=garki&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web
Chad Series: https://yawboadu.substack.com/p/the-economic-and-geopolitical-history-8d6
I'm still working on Mali but here's part 1:
https://yawboadu.substack.com/p/the-economic-and-geopolitical-history-26c
This isn't exactly smart analysis but this sounds like a clusterfuck we should not be involved in.
Involvement can clearly be a range of things. Completely ceding the region to murderous dictators and the Wagner group doesn't seem like the right strategy to me.
Completely sincere question with zero trolling:
What *REALISTIC* options exist that do not involve either murderous dictators or chaos/anarchy?
I mean, the reason this is so depressing is that, looking at the history of the region, after the fall of colonialism you seem to have nothing but a string of "Dictator A takes over and oppresses his people horribly, Wannabe Dictator B attempts a coup, there's a rebellion/civil war during which innocent people suffer horribly, Dictator B wins and turns out just as bad and oppressive as Dictator A, wash, rinse, repeat, with extra oppression and suffering" occasionally relieved by "a democratically elected leader manages to take power for a couple years before being overthrown in a coup, go back to Square 1."
I am 100% in favor of helping ordinary people who suffer, and I feel terribly sorry for them, but trying to pick winners between evil Dictator A and equally evil Rebel Leader B seems like a no-win game, and as anyone familiar with the movie "War Games" knows, the only way to win a no-win game is not to play.
"What *REALISTIC* options exist that do not involve either murderous dictators or chaos/anarchy?"
The International Crisis Group is a think-tank set up in the 1990s (*) to provide detailed background information and recommendations to policymakers when a humanitarian crisis is imminent or in progress. They have some recommendations on Sudan.
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/sudan-year-war
"The U.S., Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE – outside parties that wield significant leverage over the warring parties – have the best chances of persuading the two sides to stop fighting, allow humanitarian aid to reach those who need it and begin the hard work of knitting Sudan back together. The alternative is grim to contemplate, as the country teeters on the brink of chaos, mass starvation and a war that could spread across its borders to a troubled region. Time is of the essence – particularly since the parties are inveigling new warlords to join the fight with promises that they will share in victory’s eventual spoils, which promises to make negotiations to end the war that much more difficult.
"Against this backdrop, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are intent on reconvening talks in Jeddah. The new round should broaden to include roles for Egypt and the UAE, as Crisis Group has long argued, as well as for the new envoys from the AU, UN and IGAD, given the opportunity for reinvigorated diplomacy afforded by these appointments. A single consolidated negotiation process would allow for greater and more cohesive foreign pressure on the two sides, while closing avenues for the belligerents to continue forum shopping to evade serious negotiations. These talks should also expressly aim to reach an urgent permanent ceasefire, instead of dwelling on confidence-building measures as previously. If plans to turn the Jeddah talks into a high-level forum for ceasefire talks falter, then key actors (especially the U.S. and UN) should find a way to make the various negotiation tracks reinforce rather than undermine each other. Advancing as nimbly and quickly as possible toward a deal, using both informal and formal channels and steadily intensifying pressure on the sides should be the goal, no matter where talks take place.
"At the same time, moves to spare millions of Sudanese from starvation cannot wait. All those with influence on the conflict parties should prevail on them in public and private to allow unfettered food aid to communities in need. Outside powers should explore other options for getting food into the worst-affected areas of the country, including greater Darfur, if the warring leaders remain uncooperative. Donors should look into funnelling funds through local volunteers, particularly in the Khartoum, Darfur, Kordofan and Gezira areas, where millions are languishing after nearly all the major aid organisations fled. Donors should also stand ready to reach into their coffers to support the gravely underfunded aid response."
(*) For background information on ICG, see https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cuny/bio/hero.html
What cost would you be willing to pay for a more correct strategy?
Unsure if there is an entirely correct strategy here and I don't have the knowledge base to craft the best one here. Conceptually, I'm just in favor of the US maintaining geopolitical influence in Africa, rather than ceding that ground to the Wagner group or China.
What does maintaining geopolitical influence mean? Specifics here would be helpful.
The words of the proverbial generic American who opens the paper, says “Wow, looks like a mess”, and closes the paper, the better to not see or hear the terrible things in the world, and imagines not hearing about them and not being “involved” in them, taking comfort in the broad wide oceans on either side of him, will make them disappear.
Matt himself used to vibe that way at times. I recall him mildly celebrating Russia’s growing displacement of US power in the Middle East years ago, arguing essentially “Well now THEY get to be the ones tangled up in the region; sucks to be them.”
He appears to be evolving on that, along with events. It’s one of the reasons I read him. Even if some of his audience doesn’t, or evolves in the opposite direction.
The benefit of being a superpower is ... well, the whole super powerful part. But it means we can't ignore bad things happening around the world as easily as a lesser power can do.
Given how the rest of the world largely doesn't seem to appreciate America's continued sacrifices here I'm of the opinion we should largely step back and let the rest of the world solve their problems as we focus on growth and prosperity at home.
I’m not isolationist, but I do admit there is an element of “damned if we do, damned if we don’t “ here.
Get involved? We will be accused of neocolonialism and blamed for anything that goes wrong, and a grumpy blogger will comment on how America is the GrEaTeSt sOuRcE of EviL in the world.
Don’t get involved? We’re a bunch of racists who don’t care about Black people getting killed, and/or naive fools who don’t understand the geopolitical implications. Sigh.
The tiebreaker is that the "damned if we don't" option will save American lives and money relative to the "damned if we do" option.
America’s growth and prosperity relies on open seas and if we let CCP’s imperialism go unchecked we are creating a world with markets closed to the U.S.
This might be overstated. While I'm not sure how I feel about Allan's position in general, it doesn't seem to me that our national prosperity relies on us continuing our current, highly interventionist, policy to try and preserve all existing market access.
Trade with Africa specifically is a small and shrinking share of our gdp.
More generally, we're not North Korea. The US domestic market is very large, making us less reliant on trade than most. This paper estimates an expected loss of 2%-8% of US gdp in a world with pure US autarky. (The paper also notes that this is interestingly similar to prior estimates of the effect size of the Jeffersonian embargo of 1807 and pre-Meiji Japanese autarky.)
https://www.nber.org/digest/apr18/how-large-are-us-economys-gains-trade
We could eat a loss of that magnitude and still be substantially richer than just about everyone.
But, if that still sounds like too much to risk, I would note that there's no plausible case where a future imperial China is able to interdict US trade with Canada and Mexico, and it's hard to imagine even dramatic inhibition of our trade with Europe. And due to diminishing marginal returns, each trade partner we are able to preserve represents an outsized fraction of the benefits of trade generally.
So, the expected economic costs of more isolationism don't seem particularly weighty.
Interesting food for thought…I’ll need to think more about this but appreciate the insight.
I agree with that...but the Saudi/Iran proxy war or what's going on in northern Africa doesn't seem that important.
I suppose as long as the US isn’t too concerned about the price of oil, maybe not…but when have we ever not been too concerned about the price of oil? Domestic production might be sufficient to meet our needs, but the price is still set on world markets that can be disrupted by a war between major oil producers. Maybe the best argument for accelerating “green energy” is the possibility of not having to care about the Saudis or Iran.
I agree…there is an odd paradox that when a country like the US is at its most powerful in terms of ability to influence the world…that influence is less valuable. As the country faces more challenges and is less able to influence events is also when that influence is most important.
I think the benefits of being a superpower is being able to pick and choose what conflicts we actually want to be a part of. One thing I think America has sorely lacked in the last 50 years is the ability to prioritize. If America wants to weaken Russia’s grip in Africa, then the easiest way is to give Ukraine all of the weapons they could possibly want.
Sure we can.
In my opinion, Russia can keep Syria; they're welcome to it. I wouldn't have us switch places with them for the world.
My view of America's place in the world is very simple. There are parts of the world that are incredibly important economically, socially etc and we have to be deeply involved in them to help keep the peace and maintain global prosperity: the Indo-Pacific region and Europe. And then there are places in our neighborhood that, because we are the dominant power and our long history, we have an interest in helping succeed and keeping peaceful: Central and South America (well, Canada too).
Other than those areas, we should get involved only to the extent that it is virtually costless and risk-free for us. Otherwise, wish them the best and both sides go on their way.
I don't think Matt is really so indifferent as he seems. I think the flippant comment is more about debunking the idea that miltary interventionism is about self-interest. The same Russian nationalist who thinks this is a good idea is the same person who can articulate exactly why the US intervention in Iraq was so self-destructive.
But that doesn't mean there is nothing humanitarianly productive we can do in the region, it just means we should fool ourselves into think "we need our guy in Sudan to seize the initiative in the Middle East" or whatever the imagined US interest would be.
His flippancy seemed to be more a 2021 thing, honestly.
Back then, a lot of otherwise far-seeing center-left pundits (Matt actually not being nearly the worst on this front) were anticipating/hoping with baited breath for a future world where the US could focus on child tax credits, housing policy, health care, and all kinds of lovely domestic priorities.
Matt himself got into a roaring Twitter fight back then with Michael McFaul, of all people, basically calling him a liar (about aspects of US foreign policy toward Russia, specifically). I still remember the Slow Boring article condemning America's "militaristic" policy regarding Ukraine--in January 2022.
Wild time, that.
I bring all this crud up not to ding Matt, specifically. If anything, his (generally very good) analysis and takes nowadays show his keen sense of what's important and real, and how changeable true liberals are in the face of changing reality around the world.
I bring it up, essentially, to point out the old maxim--Whether or not Americans are interested in the world, the world, from Ukraine and Taiwan to Syria and Sudan--is very much interested in us.
We look for excuses to back away from it at our peril. My two cents.
I mean, it is fine to argue which things we should be involved in, and if you think this is one of them, make that case.
But a dogmatic 'It is our duty to make all problems disappear, rather than to ignore them' philosophy is obvious nonsense. You must pick and choose.
Also, strawman. Just because the "proverbial generic American" wishes to ignore a thing, does not mean that they are stupid enough to believe that their ignorance will "make them disappear".
To paraphrase Stannis Baratheon, "Straw men cut both ways."
Did i mischaracterize this paragraph somehow? Is this NOT implying that we are morally obligated to care about, and "get involved in" all the "terrible things in the world"? That is the implication that I refute, and it is hardly a strawman. That is, in fact, obvious nonsense.
"The words of the proverbial generic American who opens the paper, says “Wow, looks like a mess”, and closes the paper, the better to not see or hear the terrible things in the world, and imagines not hearing about them and not being “involved” in them, taking comfort in the broad wide oceans on either side of him, will make them disappear."
If that isn't what you meant to imply, speak more clearly.
Priorities are a thing. Even cosmopolitans have to make a case that the RoI for intervening in Sudan is better than alternative uses of our attention and resources. Sudan is far away and apparently has a lot of complicated and seemingly intractable problems.
I'm definitely in favor of acting when we can.
But we shouldn't pretended that resources are unlimited either. I don't know enough about Sudan to know whether it's worth it or not or what the costs are.
I mean, you say it isn't smart, but if you trained a parrot to say just that one phrase and had it travel around every room in Washington where foreign policy is discussed, its record would be about 80% better than the average cable news talking head, and 99% better than Lindsey Graham.
Right. It's actually true that the US doesn't have to be involved everywhere and the notion that it does is a very contested and contestable ideology with a spotty track record, not a self-evident truth.
100% agree. Prioritizing is all about not doing certain things, and messing around in the middle east is absolutely not worth it.
Unfortunately, it's harder for people to be concerned about a war where two warlords are using a country as their playground for power. Without an "oppressor-oppressed" narrative or a clear "good guy," it's more difficult for people to support a side.
For those who believe "America shouldn't be involved in every conflict," Sudan serves as a poignant example. When America doesn't take a commanding role, middle powers step in to fill the vacuum. Americans must decide if they are comfortable with that. Of course, more nuanced discernment mechanisms are at play.
Similarly, there's the largely ignored decade-long civil war in the Central African Republic, right beneath Sudan and Chad. You can explore more about this conflict in the economic history of the Central African Republic here.
https://yawboadu.substack.com/p/the-economic-history-of-central-african
At the same time, what can actually be done?
The UN is a lame duck, it can't lead an intervention without Russia's consent, which it won't.
Siding with either side means accepting their atrocities. Unilaterally attacking either one, or even both, even if it's just a bunch of airstrikes might change the balance of power, but could just as easily lead to more chaos and atrocities. Decapitation strikes are likewise frowned upon and prone to chaos as well.
Pretty much the only thing left is the boring diplomatic solution, which takes too long, is frustratingly opaque as to whether it's actually working -- in fact, it won't look like it's working until it finally DOES -- and requires us to rely on an absolutely depleted State Department.
I'm definitely not trying to pooh-pooh you here; I personally HATE when all a person does is shoot ideas down and not contribute any of their own. But I'm genuinely curious if you see a viable solution path here.
I didn't give an opinion either way. But my stance is America is doing the right thing by not choosing a side and by choosing the boring diplomatic resolution.
By not choosing a side, middle powers will support their side and there will be more deaths, but if America interferes, the regime that wins will look illegitimate and look like a US puppet.
I think America is at its best when it doesn't intervene directly.
Thanks for all the input and context. Your comments have been very informative
Indeed, I think that America’s role should always be the balancing power and never the direct interventionist except for crucial conflicts that directly affect its interest
In 2008, I was in South Sudan less than a year after the peace agreement with the North (eg the Khartoum government). I previously knew nothing about the Sudanese civil war - I was just there working with a global health contractor firm on a brand-new USAID project. Got up to speed quickly. I learned that close to a million people had died in the Sudanese civil war in the last few decades, and my mind swam that absolutely no one in the U.S. knew or even cared.
I spent a lot of time with our country director. One night, she mentioned to me that she slept with her loaded AK-47 under her bed. I asked... why? She shrugged. "So when war comes again, we will be ready."
"Do you think war will come again?"
She smirked. "Yes. And then we will kill them, and then kill their children, just like they did to us."
That really stuck with me.
I spent a lot of time working in Africa. The vast majority of the continent is nothing like Sudan. But most Americans dismiss pretty much all of it, and certainly the Sudanese conflict, in a way they would never do to, say, what happens in central Asia or the Middle East, and it's hard to see it once you realize it.
Slightly off-topic, but not really.
Antony Blinken, the Secretary of State, was in Kyiv this week. One stop was to play guitar in a local bar. No, I'm not kidding.
We've been so scarred by Trump's incompetence that we can't quite accept that the Biden Administration's foreign policy hasn't been effective. Yes, they are trying hard and face some difficult situations. But it hasn't been effective at avoiding escalations in almost every part of the world -- Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Iranian-backed Hamas attack on Israel, Houthis shutting down shipping in the Red Sea, what Matt describes today in Sudan and increasing tensions (thankfully not yet acted upon) between China and Taiwan. The NATO states like us better and the Administration says all the right things but I'm disappointed with the results.
Whenever we get into disappointment with Biden admin foreign policy, I have to bring up the counterfactual. Do any of the situations you describe above strike you as being better off on Earth 2 where Trump won a second term? I've detailed this in other comments, but the counterfactuals on Ukraine, Hamas/Gaza, Houthis, all would probably me more strategically favorable to our adversaries than the situation stands today, since Trump's foreign policy consisted largely of taking the US off the board and allowing the new Axis to establish their spheres on influence.
That world might look more "peaceful" but largely because we would not be backing any allies in the fight. The bad guys would still probably have gained more than they have in reality.
I think the disappointment you (and frankly I) feel is largely disappointment with the accelerating final unraveling of the unipolar moment. It sucks that the US can't keep a lid on things unilaterally anymore. The strategic way out is to revitalize alliances in Europe and the Pacific, which is something the Biden admin has been fairly successful at doing. Failure to do so will lose us Cold War 2.
I think the bar for competence should be higher than "would it better if Trump were President".
I'm not a foreign policy expert. But I know success or failure when I see it, and the last 3.5 years haven't been a success.
I can respect that, but I feel we're getting into "almighty vs alternative" territory
I'll preface this by saying that I know basically nothing about foreign policy. But forget even comparing to the Trump administration. What could or should the Biden admin have done to prevent these things from happening? It's not like there is a "keep Russia from invading Ukraine" button that Biden could have pressed but didn't.
I'm disappointed in what's happening around the world too, but I think the Biden admin is doing the best that they can
Yeah, I'm very sympathetic to John's disappointment (I'm sort of disappointed too), but this seems to come back to other actors having agency.
To pick one, Putin made a catastrophically terrible decision, and there's only so much more you could have made his options catastrophically terrible-r.
Also, Trump depleted a lot of our state capacity... literally, at State. And in the military and elsewhere. That was 4 years we could have been ACTUALLY catching up on industrial capacity, but instead fell behind.
Yeah, I'm struck by the fact that given Putin pretty clearly was planning to invade Ukraine for years (everything with Paul Manafort and his shenanigans in 2016 I think have to be seen in this light), I'd say the Ukraine war has gone as "well" as could possibly have been expected.
Now I put "well" in quotes because I'm being very relative here. Of course, the best outcome is no war at all; I'm very aware there are already over 100K dead (depending on reports on Russian military deaths) and I've seen the videos and pictures of devastation on the ground. But again, I feel fairly certain in saying that no matter who was President, Putin was determined to invade. So given that reality, I'm not sure anyone is doing better than Biden in this situation.
The most consequential thing for Ukraine was Democrats failing to hold a few more seats in 2022. Nothing could have prevented the invasion and Biden responded exactly correctly. The battlefield situation would be better if the flow of arms hadn't been interrupted for months.