Re: The economic benefits of European integration vs. Russian integration
The mistake you're making is assuming that in 2013 Ukraine was already maximally integrated into Russia economically. It wasn't. Belarus, for instance, was and is far more integrated into the Russian economy than Ukraine was, and in 2013 it had a GDP-per capita PPP not far behind Romania's, and well above that of Ukraine. (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD?locations=BY-RO-UA) Similarly, if you compare Ukrainian Oblasts on the Russian border with Russian oblasts just across the border, the latter tend to be significantly richer.
Looking at Belarus's top exports makes it clear why this is the case. "The top exports of Belarus are Refined Petroleum ($2.78B), Potassic Fertilizers ($2.44B), Cheese ($1.06B), Delivery Trucks ($637M), and Tractors ($597M)." (https://oec.world/en/profile/country/blr) Clearly they import raw materials from Russia, turn them into higher value goods, and export them to the West and also back to Russia. Russia may not have a value chain to export, but it does have one to import. In theory, Ukraine could in theory have been even better than Belarus at this, due to all of the warm water ports that it had on the Black Sea.
Also, integration with Russia would probably have been easier to pursue than integration with Europe. Reportedly one of the reasons why in 2013 Yanuckovich (who at the time was far more a puppet of local Ukrainian oligarchs than a puppet of Putin) chose Russia's trade deal over the EU trade deal was that the latter had a bunch of strings attached in regards things to fighting corruption and some austerity measures that the former did not have. Also, Ukraine's train tracks use the same gauge as Russia, which is different from the gauge used in the countries to Ukraine's West (https://mediarail.wordpress.com/ukraine-wants-to-connect-to-europe-in-1-435mm/), which over the past few months has caused some difficulties with moving supplies into and out of Ukraine.
So the comparison of the benefits of Russian and European integration was far more complex than you make it out to be. Which is probably why, contrary to the picture you paint in your paragraph about the 2004 and 2014 "revolutions," Ukrainian public opinion was far more split on the subject prior to Yanukovich's overthrow and everything that followed. As late as February 2014, 41% of polled Ukrainians said that they would prefer EU membership over membership in a Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, while 36% preferred the Russia/Belarus/Kazakhstan Customs Union. See page 38 of this PDF: https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/legacy/iri.org/2014%20April%2024%20Survey%20of%20Residents%20of%20Ukraine,%20April%203-12,%202014.pdf
This is why I used to listen to the Vox Weeds podcast. Not because I necessarily agreed with the top-level conclusions, but all the underlying information was interesting and relevant.
It’s also clarified for me why all the people who are convinced Epstein was murdered think Havana Syndrome is ridiculous and vice versa. Spoiler: conspiracy theories are almost never true.
Finally, Shure is not smart, interesting, or correct, and should not be included going forward. Find better guest writers.
The post conveniently glosses over the fact that Ukraine was the world's third largest nuclear power after separating from the USSR, and it gave up its arsenal in exchange for a promise from Russia and the US that its territorial integrity will be respected. If Russia now violates that treaty and the US accepts it, that will send the message to other countries that treaties and international laws will only protect them as long as it's convenient, and they will never truly be safe from aggressive nuclear powers unless they become nuclear powers themselves. Which would lead to nuclear proliferation and thus increase existential risk.
I take it you no longer consider former Russia ambassador Michael McFaul to be a liar--if you ever did. This is good.
Still:
It's absolutely critical we keep in mind who the "warmonger" is in this context. I've found a recurring pattern in all this debate, even among relatively reasonable doves (such as yourself), is that Russia's actions over the last ten years are simply taken for granted.
Annexing or forcibly grabbing substantial chunks of a sizeable country is not something that generally happens, or is supposed to be tolerated, in a stable 21st-century world. Yet--it has not only been tolerated, it's just understood to be the flavor of the soup we swim in now.
It feels akin to accepting the school bully is just going to beat the living daylights out of the new kid dating his ex-girlfriend. Because, y'know, Johnny Lawrence is just standing up for himself. We need to channel our cognitive empathy and understand his side of the story.
I can "understand" the side of the story of, say, Pakistan and India butting heads over Kashmir. "Understanding" this in the same way is "understanding" a paranoid hallucination.
It is no more "realistic" to indulge power grabs and illegal annexations stemming from that hallucination, than it is "realistic" to think up that hallucination to begin with.
Putin believes that Obama, the United States, and the CIA are behind Ukraine's rejection of pro-Russia politicians, and that Barack did it all while cleverly lying and scheming behind his back, falsely claiming to want "flexibility".
There's only so much you can do to imaginatively "empathize" with the mind behind that hallucination. Or to accommodate him by making promises about barring NATO membership, or officially blessing his annexations, or whatever.
I appreciate you attempting to give Putin good advice. Lord knows he needs it.
But leaving aside war, realistically and morally, we can't take stuff like what he's been doing the last decade for granted, or accept it, or treat it as currency.
If we do in this case, heaven help us when China tries the same thing. Which they will. :/
I think Putin has two distinct bur related goals: (1) he wants to be a dictator for life, and wants to pass on the mantle to his chosen successor (2) he wants to restore Russia's place in the world (mostly because he has a huge ego and wants the world to respect him, fear him).
The US is a roadblock to both these goals. Hence he spends all his time looking for ways to undermine US interests around the globe (Syria, Iran).
The other challenge he faces is dwindling sphere of influence in his backyard as nation after nation in Easter Europe bolt to the EU. As data presented above makes it clear, all EE nations that have joined the EU have seen over doubling of per capita GDP in the last 30 years. Of course Ukraine wants that too. Imagine if Ukraine were allowed to integrate its economy with the EU even if they don't join the EU. In a decade or two, average Russian will see their neighbors getting rich while they don't. It is a matter of time before the citizenry rose up in revolt and Putin is toast.
Given the above, Putin has no choice but to confront the US. Which is why the US should not give Putin a face saving path; let him back down and suffer a humiliation, or follow-through with the invasion and suffer the consequences. It is things like these that result in loss of support at home - the US should take full advantage of this situation.
How is that win-win scenario a win-win for anyone but Russia? In this scenario, they threatened force and got their way. A compromise where everyone has to give something away is this: the west and Ukraine acknowledge that Crimea is Russia's but Russia acknowledges that Ukraine can join whatever allience they like.
Putin gets a win to sell back at home, and state propaganda will package it up nicely as the outcome of a grand strategic play.
The argument in this article is why my brother thinks the most likely outcome is a punitive expedition. Send troops in, destroy all of Ukraine's industrial base and cities, and then just leave the Ukrainians to starve. We didn't do that in Iraq and Afghanistan because of the domestic politics that led to the "Pottery Barn rule". But Russia doesn't have to think that way.
Thanks for the article. There seems to be a worrying consensus growing that the US should fuel a civil war in order to send a message to China - this seems pretty psychotic.
Surely a compromise where both sides can save face and avoid conflict is the best possible outcome?
I'm skeptical that there's really a "deal" to be had here. Yes, the 2008 Bucharest Declaration was a mistake, but what prompted Putin's 2014 intervention wasn't NATO but an EU association agreement. Putin does not want a neutral or "Finlandized" Ukraine. He wants Ukraine as Russian client state - ideally he likely wants Ukraine in the Eurasian Union and in CSTO.
I know the familiar narrative that the US and the west have been overly focused on denying Russia a sphere on influence. I think the reality is a lot more mixed. For all the condemnation it drew at the time, the west quickly moved on from the Georgia War. Nobody in the western world has pushed back on Russian intervention in Nagarno-Karabakh. The west has rarely sought to counter Russian influence in Central Asia. Even Ukraine spent most of the post-Soviet years as a Russian client state which few in the west really challenged.
What changed the equation for Ukraine was domestic pressure to align with Europe. (On that note, I think Matt is overly cynical about western intentions and underplays that there is a lot of genuine sympathy in official circles for Ukraine's western / European aspirations.)
Last point, I want to push back on Matt's dismissal about inviolability of post-Soviet borders. It's not that borders can't or shouldn't ever be changed - borders should not be changed by force. Obviously that hasn't always been true. (And all major powers - certainly the US, but also Russia - were offenders in the 19th Century and before.) But no changing borders by force really has been a central organizing feature of the post-WWII settlement, and has likely been a significant factor in the decline of global conflict, given how much historical conflict has been driven by conflict over land.
Crimeans probably want to be Russian, and that's fine. But the means matter. A reasonable rapprochement deal would be something like an interim UN administration, an internationally monitored referendum (which would likely confirm Russian sovereignty), and perhaps provisions like Northern Ireland whereby residents are eligible for Ukrainian passports as well.
I think NATO interventions in Serbia and the former Yugoslavia were good, but I also admit I'm skeptical about Kosovo independence. It's a complicated situation, but it was an exception to international law and practice and has created a negative precedent that Russia has used.
(It also isn't clear to me that in the long run a Kosovo that remained loosely federated with Serbia wouldn't be a better outcome. It's not totally clear to me that having it as a small de facto international protectorate that is decades away from joining the EU is all that positive in the long run.)
Northern Cyprus is not recognized, so in that case the principle is upheld. Kosovo was an independence movement with foreign backing, which is the most common way for countries emerge. Russia didn't go for an independent Crimea, it annexed it. It's also giving Russian citizenship to residents of it's two puppet republics, which is not happening in Kosovo. So, yes, Russia seeks to invade, occupy, and annex its neighbors.
Northern Cyprus is occupied by NATO member forces though. Are NATO members gonna sanction themselves in the same way they sanction Russia over Crimea?
I’m okay with the existence of Kosovo (and I’m okay with Crimea being part of Russia as it was in the past). I’m just pointing out that Serbia’s borders changed after a war, so I don’t see how they changed without force.
If your red line is annexation, are you advocating for the recognition of the Luhansk and Donetsk republics?
Finally, I could have used the Golan Heights or something similar, but I specifically wanted examples where NATO forces were involved.
No, Northern Cyprus is occupied by Turkish soldiers. There are British bases in Cyprus, which predate the creation of Northern Cyprus. If Greek military police beat up protesters in Athens, was that a NATO military action? The US doesn't have to recognize other countries or statelets. I'm against recognizing annexations by countries of their neighbor's territory through force. Aggressive war for territorial expansion lead to disaster in WWI and WWII for the world and is still a bad idea. It's unfortunate that Russia is so enamored of it, and holds up Stalin as an exemplar now, who loved it so. It will cause a lot of destruction in the world and to Russia itself.
Okay, I accept that Turkey acted without NATO authorization and the British presence on Cyprus dates back to the colonial times. That doesn’t explain why they don’t face crippling sanctions right now (maybe only Turkey, if you want to use the argument that the British were there before the UN was created). The Greek military police beating up protesters won’t change any borders.
We agree however that wars of aggression are bad, which is why I was happy to see NATO terminate the occupation of Afghanistan.
Why do you see Afghanistan as a war of aggression? The Taliban allowed a military force to plot and execute a military strike on the United States and then protected them. The US then declared that a casus belli and overthrew the hostile Taliban government. Do you think the US had no justification for attacking Afghanistan? Do you think the war in the Donbas is a war of aggression?
Northern Cyprus does face crippling sanctions right now. Russia didn't face crippling sanctions after it failed to leave the Transdniester Republic (despite agreements) or when it attacked and quasi-annexed parts of Georgia (most of the leadership in the two breakaway republics are Russian citizens). It was only after it did it again in Ukraine and then shot down a civilian airplane (and lied about it repeatedly), that the sanctions began to bite. Everyone is getting sick of Russia pulling the same stunt over and over again.
The claim that 'there is a lot of genuine sympathy in official circles for Ukraine's western / European aspirations' is clearly true in many context, especially in Washington and London.
However, this 'symapthy' does not extend to unanimous support for Ukrainian membership of either NATO or the EU. Ukraine will not be admitted to NATO as France and Germany will veto it; in any case it would be absurd to admit a country to a mutual defence pact when it is currently engaged in irregular warfare within its own borders, against forces supported by a nuclear superpower.
EU membership prospects are no better; for one thing EU enlargement is on the back burner and has been for a while, with little appetite in European capitals for a further round of enlargement. For another, Ukraine is even more corrupt, less democratic, poorer, and has a larger population than the currently troublesome group of Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. It's miles from meeting the criteria for membership.
What I would say is that there isn't an *inherent* Western desire to see Ukraine aligned with the west. Had Ukrainians preferred to remain Russia-aligned I don't think there would be significant pushback.
But that's different from a situation where the Ukrainian public by and large prefers to align with the west. And coupled with the fact that Putin's Russia is an authoritarian revisionist power, that drives a lot of sympathy for Ukraine. And it's clear that even western alignment short of full EU or NATO membership is a red line for Putin.
(For what it's worth, the US and most western powers opposed the breakup of the USSR and had things worked out such that Ukraine remained in some sort of post-Soviet federation I don't think any western capital would have lost any sleep over it. If anything, many in the EU would be happy for the EU's current western boundary to become permanent.)
>>A peaceful, stable Ukraine that successfully fights corruption and that builds commercial ties to central and western Europe could become rich. . . And its prospects as a country under quasi-occupation by the Russian military, wracked by constant political instability and with tons of people fleeing, are not good at all.
>>Russia would be, at potentially great cost, picking up something essentially worthless to them.. . .
>>There really ought to be a win-win here where Russia doesn’t invade Ukraine, Ukraine disavows NATO membership, the western powers acknowledge the referendum that incorporated Crimea into Russia, Russia acknowledges that Ukraine can follow the footsteps of Sweden, Finland, and Austria into the EU without violating neutrality, and everyone goes back to buying and selling natural gas instead of killing each other.<<
I believe this is a fundamentally wrong view of the situation and especially of Russia's view of its strategic interests. And I think we're totally misunderstanding the debate as one of Ukraine's possible entry into NATO, despite what Russia is saying.
It's hard to believe that Putin is *that* worried about a military threat on his western flank (despite 1812 and 1941 and all that). But we *do* know what he is worried about, because he has acted against that threat constantly: and this is a dissatisfied Russian population, fed up with the corruption and economic incompetence of the Putin regime. Like Xi, though more so, he fears the ire of the people rising against him, and threatening the rule of him and his fellow oligarchs. And one source of that ire is seeing nearby countries pick an alternative model, and flourishing. In particular, East European countries that enter the EU, and see growth rates far exceeding those of Ukraine or Russia, not to mention (in most instances) far more political freedom.
*That's* what Putin and his cronies ultimately fear. So the idea that it's a "win-win" for Ukraine to join the EU and grow more than Russia is just wrong. Putin *wants* Ukraine to stay relatively poor and misgoverned (relative to Russia at least) so it can't serve as a model for his subjects to aspire to. That's how he can keep Ukraine from becoming a strategic threat to the survival of his regime.
The only confusing thing here is his focus on NATO. I think it's a stalking horse, and a stand-in for the EU. Imagine that Europe (with the US) says, OK, Ukraine will never join NATO, but we would welcome its joining the EU (after passing some qualification tests). Would Putin be fine with that deal?
The timeline on which Ukraine could prosper due to its western affiliation is entirely irrelevant to Putin's personal ambitions. He is 70, his career won't be in any way affected by Ukraine becoming a role model thirty years from now.
I've seen this argument before, and it likely has some merit, but it neglects the fact that Russia has hated NATO expansion for decades, even before Putin. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin strongly opposed it, yet the West did it anyway, partially because Russia was so weak and chaotic in the 90s that they couldn't really do much about it. But the grievances kept building up over time, and now Putin sees a chance to fix the mistakes of the 90s and re-alter Europe's security landscape.
There are also historical and cultural factors at play. Seeing Ukraine, the actual birthplace of "Russian" civilization under the Kievan Rus, falling fully under the Western umbrella would likely be intolerable to most average Russians, let alone the hardliners in Putin's government.
There's truth to this but as with many things it's complicated. NATO expansion was deeply unpopular with Yeltsin and his circle, but it's also true that (although it was driven by weakness) they did consent to it. Putin for his part consented to NATO expansion into the Baltics in the early 2000s. And both under Yeltsin and early under Putin there were Russian inquiries about *joining* NATO. (Or joining politically while keeping outside the military structure, a la France between De Gaulle and Sarkozy.)
I think it would probably have been better if a separate European defense alliance - led by the EU - had been stood up at that time and used to incorporate Eastern European states. But to be fair that counterfactual falters a little bit on how difficult it has been to coordinate EU-wide defense policy even now absent US leadership. And it's also not clear that a revisionist regime like Putin's wouldn't view that as equivalent to NATO expansion (especially if the US were involved in arming and coordinating such an alliance).
The other big missing factor when we talk about US/Russian estrangement post-91 is the Yugoslav Wars, especially the '99 NATO campaign in support of Kosovo. That, even more than enlargement, drove Russian fears that NATO were just a tool against Russia and its allies.
Oh I’m 100% behind lavishly funding the Ukrainian rebels. Just what Putin deserve, a nice long economically devastating quagmire.
Surprisingly one of our strongest allies these days is Vietnam. Maybe we can ask them to send some “advisers” to Ukraine and to show them how it’s done. They have to a few old colonels who want to get back in the game.
It is true that relations between Vietnam's government and America's have improved significantly in recent decades; that does not make the countries allies.
"There really ought to be a win-win here where Russia doesn’t invade Ukraine, Ukraine disavows NATO membership, the western powers acknowledge the referendum that incorporated Crimea into Russia, Russia acknowledges that Ukraine can follow the footsteps of Sweden, Finland, and Austria into the EU without violating neutrality, and everyone goes back to buying and selling natural gas instead of killing each other."
Why should we acknowledge the referendum that incorporated Crimea? We didn't acknowledge the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR, even though the USSR claimed those to be legitimate. And we were right to do so, and now have prosperous independent states in the Baltics. Russia promised respect for Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea, and hasn't delivered at all. In fact, repression of Crimean Tatars is ongoing. What benefit from a realist perspective is there if we legitimate conquest and annexation of parts of other countries, particularly after we sign agreements with that country where they promise to respect their borders (Budapest Memorandum). I don't see any benefit for the US in trading away Crimean recognition.
Secondly, I think Matt should talk to some non-Russian people from the former Soviet Union. It may be "fake federalism" to the Russians, but it wasn't to the Kazakhs or Ukrainians. Some of them even had their own UN seats. Just because the Russians want to have an empire doesn't mean we have to support it. The current name of the country is the "Russian Federation". If they think federalism is fake, then they should change their own name. I don't see why we should prioritize Russian views as opposed to others, who might be much more friendly to us.
This post is very confused. You argue against acknowledging the Crimean referendum by reference to the Baltic states, but the Baltic states are not a good comparison; they had separate cultures defined *in opposition* to Russian rule, the exact opposite of the majority of the population of the Crimean peninsula. You say you 'don't see any benefit for the US in trading away Crimean recognition' but Crimea is now part of Russia and that isn't going to change, so the US has a low-cost bargaining chip on a topic nothing can be done about and they have little reason to care about. Finally, Russia *is* a federation, and indeed the outcome of the Minsk Agreement was for a federal/devolved solution for the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces. I don't see how you got from that to concluding 'they think federalism is fake'.
Part of the reason the majority of the Crimean peninsula is semi-ok with Russian rule is that the Soviets liquidated large parts of the Crimean population, and the Russian state is fine with it and continues to abet it.
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian identity is defined against Russian rule. I know that you and many other people (mostly Russians) want to erase Crimean Tatars from history, but that doesn't mean we have to go along with it. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deportation_of_the_Crimean_Tatars) People said the exact same thing about the Baltic states after WWII that you are saying about Crimea now, so I don't see why we should accept that "Crimea is now part of Russia and that isn't going to change". I'm not the one who calls the federalism of the USSR and Russia "fake federalism", that's Matt Y and his Russian correspondents. Matt conspicuously uses "fake federalism" in his post. Your beef is with him.
Well, you do not 'know that you . . . want to erase Crimean Tatars from history', because you do not know me or anything about me, I do not want to do such a thing, and my post did not even mention Crimean Tatars. I would prefer it if you stopped slandering me on the basis of literally nothing at all, it's very poor form.
The Russians aren't all bad. Why, at the Sochi Olympics, the Russians built a wonderful ice palace for only Canadians to win gold medals in. Thanks dudes.
While your conclusion about not invading the Ukraine is sound your analysis has some very grievous errors. Casting Russia's point of view as legitimate against Western and principally American opposition and intransigence is not very astute. Russia just isn't the great power they once were. But they want to be treated as if they were. I suppose you could characterize what they did in Syria as just normal stuff. It wasn't. Not were any of the online shenanigans and political operations they have engaged in since the fall of the Soviet Union.
Syria was not even a tactical military success for the Russians. But it was a great political success. In a place where they had exactly zero economic interests and at significant cost they managed to kill hundreds of thousands of civilians by proxy and even more importantly drive millions of Syrians of refugees into the West and elsewhere. While at the same time fostering nativist anti-immigrant sentiment in the west to such a degree that they got the British to Brexit. And foster dissent throughout the EU leading to the rise of nationalist and ultra-nationalist right wing parties. Quite the political and intelligence coup that was. ( Parenthetically war mongering Hillary Clinton was absolutely right. The key to preventing that Syrian fiasco was establishing safe zones and both military and economic aid so those Syrians did not have to flee their own country.)
I believe the lesson was learned. So no, Putin will not be allowed to this in the Ukraine. Which rather means support for the Ukraine cannot just be limited to dumping in weapons while Russia creates another refugee crisis that will dwarf what happened in Syria. That cannot be allowed to happen. Which rather implies a very large safe zone within Ukraine. And that is where the military action will take place should Russia attempt a large scale invasion.
What troubles me most about your assessment is the casual disregard for the lives at stake. Makes me wonder what you have planned for Canada. I mean if the Russians are entitled to vassal states....
Language like "can't be allowed to happen" implies a level of binary action that I just don't think contributes to the conversation. Counties respond to each others' actions, but there are obviously limits to their ability to *control* each other.
There are responses that the United States theoretically could take, but never would. I will assume for the sake of argument that you would not be in favor of an all-out nuclear strike on Russia if their tanks rolled down the street in Kyiv. So you're certainly willing to "allow" the Russians to invade and conquer Ukraine.
As the apocryphal Churchill quote goes, now we're just haggling over the price.
I think it would be perfectly reasonable and not difficult to screw up the Russian economy should they invade the parts of the Ukraine they haven't. You know who also knows this? The Russians. And I am not willing to allow the Russians to do any such thing as invade.
That's not what "allow" means, though. That's "we should make the consequences [economic or otherwise] so severe that the Russians have absolutely no interest in paying the price for invasion". And I fully agree with the latter sentiment.
To wit: the framing of "how could the US have allowed Russia to invade Ukraine?" is only a hop, skip, and a jump away from "how could the US have left Afghanistan without fixing it?"
It's amazing to me that Matt can write this column without a word about China/Taiwan, which is a key strategic reason that it's important to reassert the inviolability of national sovereignty and to work out the details of a potent sanctions regime. Similarly, Matt makes no mention of the impact of a Russian invasion on the Baltics, Poland and other former-Soviet bloc states.
This criticism is certainly fair, but I think the article still articulates some key ideas. It's important for Putin to understand that it really is the principle of the issue. Which is why there won't be a big reward for Putin for not invading (he's not actually holding the west hostage), but there will be penalties for doing so. At the same time, western leaders probably should look for a way to help Putin save face backing down, because that is a win-win outcome. Ukraine making a statement about NATO membership might be enough.
The article mentions gas supply to Europe in passing, but it is worth noting that a) gas supplies and pipelines are being used as a political tool, b) current gas in storage in Europe appears to be historically low as a result of deliberate actions starting last year, c) gas exports are an important source of revenue for Russia, d) gas is most profitably sold by pipeline to nearby customers.
It is not hard to imagine a sequence of events where Russia cuts off gas temporarily (at small cost to itself) and sets in motion a sequence of events that results in permanent damage to its gas exports (tens of billions in lost exports) by prodding the EU towards energy independence at a much accelerated pace.
"Back when counterinsurgency was a hot topic in the mid-aughts, a lot of leading experts said that a successful occupation requires one occupying soldier for every 40 civilians in the occupied country. I’m not sure that’s right, but among people who don’t think occupations are inevitably doomed, it seems to be the leading theory as to why they fail so frequently. "
The Ukraine has been successfully occupied by Poland and Russia since at least the 19th century. I don't think an occupation would be difficult at all.
My understanding is that those occupations took place before the advent of Ukrainian nationalism and were made much easier because of it. In general, colonial-era occupations seem to have been much less costly to the occupiers than nationalism-era occupations. Matt mentioned the costliness of the Iraq War, for example, but it's worth remembering that the Ottoman Turks conquered and occupied Arab Mesopotamia pretty sustainably for centuries before Arab nationalism began to develop.
The claim is that in the 19th century, occupations were possible, but by the late 20th century they haven't been. Technology has improved the ability to resist more than the ability to pacify.
Weapons technology is a big part of it but another big part of it is information technology. In the 19th century and earlier, when there was little mass media and most people couldn't read, people knew they were being oppressed mainly through witnessing it in person or hearing word of mouth. Since the 20th century, most people have been able to read about it or hear it on the radio. It also made it much easier to spread romantic ideas about national identity and what not.
Re: The economic benefits of European integration vs. Russian integration
The mistake you're making is assuming that in 2013 Ukraine was already maximally integrated into Russia economically. It wasn't. Belarus, for instance, was and is far more integrated into the Russian economy than Ukraine was, and in 2013 it had a GDP-per capita PPP not far behind Romania's, and well above that of Ukraine. (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD?locations=BY-RO-UA) Similarly, if you compare Ukrainian Oblasts on the Russian border with Russian oblasts just across the border, the latter tend to be significantly richer.
Looking at Belarus's top exports makes it clear why this is the case. "The top exports of Belarus are Refined Petroleum ($2.78B), Potassic Fertilizers ($2.44B), Cheese ($1.06B), Delivery Trucks ($637M), and Tractors ($597M)." (https://oec.world/en/profile/country/blr) Clearly they import raw materials from Russia, turn them into higher value goods, and export them to the West and also back to Russia. Russia may not have a value chain to export, but it does have one to import. In theory, Ukraine could in theory have been even better than Belarus at this, due to all of the warm water ports that it had on the Black Sea.
Also, integration with Russia would probably have been easier to pursue than integration with Europe. Reportedly one of the reasons why in 2013 Yanuckovich (who at the time was far more a puppet of local Ukrainian oligarchs than a puppet of Putin) chose Russia's trade deal over the EU trade deal was that the latter had a bunch of strings attached in regards things to fighting corruption and some austerity measures that the former did not have. Also, Ukraine's train tracks use the same gauge as Russia, which is different from the gauge used in the countries to Ukraine's West (https://mediarail.wordpress.com/ukraine-wants-to-connect-to-europe-in-1-435mm/), which over the past few months has caused some difficulties with moving supplies into and out of Ukraine.
So the comparison of the benefits of Russian and European integration was far more complex than you make it out to be. Which is probably why, contrary to the picture you paint in your paragraph about the 2004 and 2014 "revolutions," Ukrainian public opinion was far more split on the subject prior to Yanukovich's overthrow and everything that followed. As late as February 2014, 41% of polled Ukrainians said that they would prefer EU membership over membership in a Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, while 36% preferred the Russia/Belarus/Kazakhstan Customs Union. See page 38 of this PDF: https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/legacy/iri.org/2014%20April%2024%20Survey%20of%20Residents%20of%20Ukraine,%20April%203-12,%202014.pdf
The Orange Revolution and Euromaidan succeeded not because those causes had overwhelming public support, but because: 1) As seen from Presidential election results, Pro-Western Ukrainians heavily outnumbered Pro-Russian Ukrainians in the Kyiv area specifically (https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/26/%D0%94%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B3%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D1%82%D1%83%D1%80_2010_%D0%BF%D0%BE_%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B3%D0%B0%D1%85-en.png), and 2) In both cases the protestors received a lot of assistance from the US government and the West in general, but that's another story.
This is why I used to listen to the Vox Weeds podcast. Not because I necessarily agreed with the top-level conclusions, but all the underlying information was interesting and relevant.
It’s also clarified for me why all the people who are convinced Epstein was murdered think Havana Syndrome is ridiculous and vice versa. Spoiler: conspiracy theories are almost never true.
Finally, Shure is not smart, interesting, or correct, and should not be included going forward. Find better guest writers.
The post conveniently glosses over the fact that Ukraine was the world's third largest nuclear power after separating from the USSR, and it gave up its arsenal in exchange for a promise from Russia and the US that its territorial integrity will be respected. If Russia now violates that treaty and the US accepts it, that will send the message to other countries that treaties and international laws will only protect them as long as it's convenient, and they will never truly be safe from aggressive nuclear powers unless they become nuclear powers themselves. Which would lead to nuclear proliferation and thus increase existential risk.
I take it you no longer consider former Russia ambassador Michael McFaul to be a liar--if you ever did. This is good.
Still:
It's absolutely critical we keep in mind who the "warmonger" is in this context. I've found a recurring pattern in all this debate, even among relatively reasonable doves (such as yourself), is that Russia's actions over the last ten years are simply taken for granted.
Annexing or forcibly grabbing substantial chunks of a sizeable country is not something that generally happens, or is supposed to be tolerated, in a stable 21st-century world. Yet--it has not only been tolerated, it's just understood to be the flavor of the soup we swim in now.
It feels akin to accepting the school bully is just going to beat the living daylights out of the new kid dating his ex-girlfriend. Because, y'know, Johnny Lawrence is just standing up for himself. We need to channel our cognitive empathy and understand his side of the story.
I can "understand" the side of the story of, say, Pakistan and India butting heads over Kashmir. "Understanding" this in the same way is "understanding" a paranoid hallucination.
It is no more "realistic" to indulge power grabs and illegal annexations stemming from that hallucination, than it is "realistic" to think up that hallucination to begin with.
Putin believes that Obama, the United States, and the CIA are behind Ukraine's rejection of pro-Russia politicians, and that Barack did it all while cleverly lying and scheming behind his back, falsely claiming to want "flexibility".
There's only so much you can do to imaginatively "empathize" with the mind behind that hallucination. Or to accommodate him by making promises about barring NATO membership, or officially blessing his annexations, or whatever.
I appreciate you attempting to give Putin good advice. Lord knows he needs it.
But leaving aside war, realistically and morally, we can't take stuff like what he's been doing the last decade for granted, or accept it, or treat it as currency.
If we do in this case, heaven help us when China tries the same thing. Which they will. :/
I think Putin has two distinct bur related goals: (1) he wants to be a dictator for life, and wants to pass on the mantle to his chosen successor (2) he wants to restore Russia's place in the world (mostly because he has a huge ego and wants the world to respect him, fear him).
The US is a roadblock to both these goals. Hence he spends all his time looking for ways to undermine US interests around the globe (Syria, Iran).
The other challenge he faces is dwindling sphere of influence in his backyard as nation after nation in Easter Europe bolt to the EU. As data presented above makes it clear, all EE nations that have joined the EU have seen over doubling of per capita GDP in the last 30 years. Of course Ukraine wants that too. Imagine if Ukraine were allowed to integrate its economy with the EU even if they don't join the EU. In a decade or two, average Russian will see their neighbors getting rich while they don't. It is a matter of time before the citizenry rose up in revolt and Putin is toast.
Given the above, Putin has no choice but to confront the US. Which is why the US should not give Putin a face saving path; let him back down and suffer a humiliation, or follow-through with the invasion and suffer the consequences. It is things like these that result in loss of support at home - the US should take full advantage of this situation.
How is that win-win scenario a win-win for anyone but Russia? In this scenario, they threatened force and got their way. A compromise where everyone has to give something away is this: the west and Ukraine acknowledge that Crimea is Russia's but Russia acknowledges that Ukraine can join whatever allience they like.
Putin gets a win to sell back at home, and state propaganda will package it up nicely as the outcome of a grand strategic play.
The argument in this article is why my brother thinks the most likely outcome is a punitive expedition. Send troops in, destroy all of Ukraine's industrial base and cities, and then just leave the Ukrainians to starve. We didn't do that in Iraq and Afghanistan because of the domestic politics that led to the "Pottery Barn rule". But Russia doesn't have to think that way.
Thanks for the article. There seems to be a worrying consensus growing that the US should fuel a civil war in order to send a message to China - this seems pretty psychotic.
Surely a compromise where both sides can save face and avoid conflict is the best possible outcome?
I'm skeptical that there's really a "deal" to be had here. Yes, the 2008 Bucharest Declaration was a mistake, but what prompted Putin's 2014 intervention wasn't NATO but an EU association agreement. Putin does not want a neutral or "Finlandized" Ukraine. He wants Ukraine as Russian client state - ideally he likely wants Ukraine in the Eurasian Union and in CSTO.
I know the familiar narrative that the US and the west have been overly focused on denying Russia a sphere on influence. I think the reality is a lot more mixed. For all the condemnation it drew at the time, the west quickly moved on from the Georgia War. Nobody in the western world has pushed back on Russian intervention in Nagarno-Karabakh. The west has rarely sought to counter Russian influence in Central Asia. Even Ukraine spent most of the post-Soviet years as a Russian client state which few in the west really challenged.
What changed the equation for Ukraine was domestic pressure to align with Europe. (On that note, I think Matt is overly cynical about western intentions and underplays that there is a lot of genuine sympathy in official circles for Ukraine's western / European aspirations.)
Last point, I want to push back on Matt's dismissal about inviolability of post-Soviet borders. It's not that borders can't or shouldn't ever be changed - borders should not be changed by force. Obviously that hasn't always been true. (And all major powers - certainly the US, but also Russia - were offenders in the 19th Century and before.) But no changing borders by force really has been a central organizing feature of the post-WWII settlement, and has likely been a significant factor in the decline of global conflict, given how much historical conflict has been driven by conflict over land.
Crimeans probably want to be Russian, and that's fine. But the means matter. A reasonable rapprochement deal would be something like an interim UN administration, an internationally monitored referendum (which would likely confirm Russian sovereignty), and perhaps provisions like Northern Ireland whereby residents are eligible for Ukrainian passports as well.
The “no changing borders by force” includes Kosovo and Northern Cyprus?
I think NATO interventions in Serbia and the former Yugoslavia were good, but I also admit I'm skeptical about Kosovo independence. It's a complicated situation, but it was an exception to international law and practice and has created a negative precedent that Russia has used.
(It also isn't clear to me that in the long run a Kosovo that remained loosely federated with Serbia wouldn't be a better outcome. It's not totally clear to me that having it as a small de facto international protectorate that is decades away from joining the EU is all that positive in the long run.)
I think ending ethnic cleansing is good, especially when it’s happening very close by.
Northern Cyprus is not recognized, so in that case the principle is upheld. Kosovo was an independence movement with foreign backing, which is the most common way for countries emerge. Russia didn't go for an independent Crimea, it annexed it. It's also giving Russian citizenship to residents of it's two puppet republics, which is not happening in Kosovo. So, yes, Russia seeks to invade, occupy, and annex its neighbors.
Northern Cyprus is occupied by NATO member forces though. Are NATO members gonna sanction themselves in the same way they sanction Russia over Crimea?
I’m okay with the existence of Kosovo (and I’m okay with Crimea being part of Russia as it was in the past). I’m just pointing out that Serbia’s borders changed after a war, so I don’t see how they changed without force.
If your red line is annexation, are you advocating for the recognition of the Luhansk and Donetsk republics?
Finally, I could have used the Golan Heights or something similar, but I specifically wanted examples where NATO forces were involved.
No, Northern Cyprus is occupied by Turkish soldiers. There are British bases in Cyprus, which predate the creation of Northern Cyprus. If Greek military police beat up protesters in Athens, was that a NATO military action? The US doesn't have to recognize other countries or statelets. I'm against recognizing annexations by countries of their neighbor's territory through force. Aggressive war for territorial expansion lead to disaster in WWI and WWII for the world and is still a bad idea. It's unfortunate that Russia is so enamored of it, and holds up Stalin as an exemplar now, who loved it so. It will cause a lot of destruction in the world and to Russia itself.
Okay, I accept that Turkey acted without NATO authorization and the British presence on Cyprus dates back to the colonial times. That doesn’t explain why they don’t face crippling sanctions right now (maybe only Turkey, if you want to use the argument that the British were there before the UN was created). The Greek military police beating up protesters won’t change any borders.
We agree however that wars of aggression are bad, which is why I was happy to see NATO terminate the occupation of Afghanistan.
Why do you see Afghanistan as a war of aggression? The Taliban allowed a military force to plot and execute a military strike on the United States and then protected them. The US then declared that a casus belli and overthrew the hostile Taliban government. Do you think the US had no justification for attacking Afghanistan? Do you think the war in the Donbas is a war of aggression?
Northern Cyprus does face crippling sanctions right now. Russia didn't face crippling sanctions after it failed to leave the Transdniester Republic (despite agreements) or when it attacked and quasi-annexed parts of Georgia (most of the leadership in the two breakaway republics are Russian citizens). It was only after it did it again in Ukraine and then shot down a civilian airplane (and lied about it repeatedly), that the sanctions began to bite. Everyone is getting sick of Russia pulling the same stunt over and over again.
The claim that 'there is a lot of genuine sympathy in official circles for Ukraine's western / European aspirations' is clearly true in many context, especially in Washington and London.
However, this 'symapthy' does not extend to unanimous support for Ukrainian membership of either NATO or the EU. Ukraine will not be admitted to NATO as France and Germany will veto it; in any case it would be absurd to admit a country to a mutual defence pact when it is currently engaged in irregular warfare within its own borders, against forces supported by a nuclear superpower.
EU membership prospects are no better; for one thing EU enlargement is on the back burner and has been for a while, with little appetite in European capitals for a further round of enlargement. For another, Ukraine is even more corrupt, less democratic, poorer, and has a larger population than the currently troublesome group of Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. It's miles from meeting the criteria for membership.
Don't disagree with any of this.
What I would say is that there isn't an *inherent* Western desire to see Ukraine aligned with the west. Had Ukrainians preferred to remain Russia-aligned I don't think there would be significant pushback.
But that's different from a situation where the Ukrainian public by and large prefers to align with the west. And coupled with the fact that Putin's Russia is an authoritarian revisionist power, that drives a lot of sympathy for Ukraine. And it's clear that even western alignment short of full EU or NATO membership is a red line for Putin.
(For what it's worth, the US and most western powers opposed the breakup of the USSR and had things worked out such that Ukraine remained in some sort of post-Soviet federation I don't think any western capital would have lost any sleep over it. If anything, many in the EU would be happy for the EU's current western boundary to become permanent.)
>>A peaceful, stable Ukraine that successfully fights corruption and that builds commercial ties to central and western Europe could become rich. . . And its prospects as a country under quasi-occupation by the Russian military, wracked by constant political instability and with tons of people fleeing, are not good at all.
>>Russia would be, at potentially great cost, picking up something essentially worthless to them.. . .
>>There really ought to be a win-win here where Russia doesn’t invade Ukraine, Ukraine disavows NATO membership, the western powers acknowledge the referendum that incorporated Crimea into Russia, Russia acknowledges that Ukraine can follow the footsteps of Sweden, Finland, and Austria into the EU without violating neutrality, and everyone goes back to buying and selling natural gas instead of killing each other.<<
I believe this is a fundamentally wrong view of the situation and especially of Russia's view of its strategic interests. And I think we're totally misunderstanding the debate as one of Ukraine's possible entry into NATO, despite what Russia is saying.
It's hard to believe that Putin is *that* worried about a military threat on his western flank (despite 1812 and 1941 and all that). But we *do* know what he is worried about, because he has acted against that threat constantly: and this is a dissatisfied Russian population, fed up with the corruption and economic incompetence of the Putin regime. Like Xi, though more so, he fears the ire of the people rising against him, and threatening the rule of him and his fellow oligarchs. And one source of that ire is seeing nearby countries pick an alternative model, and flourishing. In particular, East European countries that enter the EU, and see growth rates far exceeding those of Ukraine or Russia, not to mention (in most instances) far more political freedom.
*That's* what Putin and his cronies ultimately fear. So the idea that it's a "win-win" for Ukraine to join the EU and grow more than Russia is just wrong. Putin *wants* Ukraine to stay relatively poor and misgoverned (relative to Russia at least) so it can't serve as a model for his subjects to aspire to. That's how he can keep Ukraine from becoming a strategic threat to the survival of his regime.
The only confusing thing here is his focus on NATO. I think it's a stalking horse, and a stand-in for the EU. Imagine that Europe (with the US) says, OK, Ukraine will never join NATO, but we would welcome its joining the EU (after passing some qualification tests). Would Putin be fine with that deal?
No, he would not.
The timeline on which Ukraine could prosper due to its western affiliation is entirely irrelevant to Putin's personal ambitions. He is 70, his career won't be in any way affected by Ukraine becoming a role model thirty years from now.
I've seen this argument before, and it likely has some merit, but it neglects the fact that Russia has hated NATO expansion for decades, even before Putin. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin strongly opposed it, yet the West did it anyway, partially because Russia was so weak and chaotic in the 90s that they couldn't really do much about it. But the grievances kept building up over time, and now Putin sees a chance to fix the mistakes of the 90s and re-alter Europe's security landscape.
There are also historical and cultural factors at play. Seeing Ukraine, the actual birthplace of "Russian" civilization under the Kievan Rus, falling fully under the Western umbrella would likely be intolerable to most average Russians, let alone the hardliners in Putin's government.
There's truth to this but as with many things it's complicated. NATO expansion was deeply unpopular with Yeltsin and his circle, but it's also true that (although it was driven by weakness) they did consent to it. Putin for his part consented to NATO expansion into the Baltics in the early 2000s. And both under Yeltsin and early under Putin there were Russian inquiries about *joining* NATO. (Or joining politically while keeping outside the military structure, a la France between De Gaulle and Sarkozy.)
I think it would probably have been better if a separate European defense alliance - led by the EU - had been stood up at that time and used to incorporate Eastern European states. But to be fair that counterfactual falters a little bit on how difficult it has been to coordinate EU-wide defense policy even now absent US leadership. And it's also not clear that a revisionist regime like Putin's wouldn't view that as equivalent to NATO expansion (especially if the US were involved in arming and coordinating such an alliance).
The other big missing factor when we talk about US/Russian estrangement post-91 is the Yugoslav Wars, especially the '99 NATO campaign in support of Kosovo. That, even more than enlargement, drove Russian fears that NATO were just a tool against Russia and its allies.
Oh I’m 100% behind lavishly funding the Ukrainian rebels. Just what Putin deserve, a nice long economically devastating quagmire.
Surprisingly one of our strongest allies these days is Vietnam. Maybe we can ask them to send some “advisers” to Ukraine and to show them how it’s done. They have to a few old colonels who want to get back in the game.
'One of our strongest allies these days is Vietnam' - are you sure?
Yup -
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/30/vietnamese-see-u-s-as-key-ally/
Vietnam is not a US ally. See, e.g. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-vietnam/ ('a trusted partnership'), or https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/index.htm (no collective defense agreement).
It is true that relations between Vietnam's government and America's have improved significantly in recent decades; that does not make the countries allies.
The enemy of my enemy is my friend.
"There really ought to be a win-win here where Russia doesn’t invade Ukraine, Ukraine disavows NATO membership, the western powers acknowledge the referendum that incorporated Crimea into Russia, Russia acknowledges that Ukraine can follow the footsteps of Sweden, Finland, and Austria into the EU without violating neutrality, and everyone goes back to buying and selling natural gas instead of killing each other."
Why should we acknowledge the referendum that incorporated Crimea? We didn't acknowledge the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR, even though the USSR claimed those to be legitimate. And we were right to do so, and now have prosperous independent states in the Baltics. Russia promised respect for Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea, and hasn't delivered at all. In fact, repression of Crimean Tatars is ongoing. What benefit from a realist perspective is there if we legitimate conquest and annexation of parts of other countries, particularly after we sign agreements with that country where they promise to respect their borders (Budapest Memorandum). I don't see any benefit for the US in trading away Crimean recognition.
Secondly, I think Matt should talk to some non-Russian people from the former Soviet Union. It may be "fake federalism" to the Russians, but it wasn't to the Kazakhs or Ukrainians. Some of them even had their own UN seats. Just because the Russians want to have an empire doesn't mean we have to support it. The current name of the country is the "Russian Federation". If they think federalism is fake, then they should change their own name. I don't see why we should prioritize Russian views as opposed to others, who might be much more friendly to us.
This post is very confused. You argue against acknowledging the Crimean referendum by reference to the Baltic states, but the Baltic states are not a good comparison; they had separate cultures defined *in opposition* to Russian rule, the exact opposite of the majority of the population of the Crimean peninsula. You say you 'don't see any benefit for the US in trading away Crimean recognition' but Crimea is now part of Russia and that isn't going to change, so the US has a low-cost bargaining chip on a topic nothing can be done about and they have little reason to care about. Finally, Russia *is* a federation, and indeed the outcome of the Minsk Agreement was for a federal/devolved solution for the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces. I don't see how you got from that to concluding 'they think federalism is fake'.
Part of the reason the majority of the Crimean peninsula is semi-ok with Russian rule is that the Soviets liquidated large parts of the Crimean population, and the Russian state is fine with it and continues to abet it.
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian identity is defined against Russian rule. I know that you and many other people (mostly Russians) want to erase Crimean Tatars from history, but that doesn't mean we have to go along with it. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deportation_of_the_Crimean_Tatars) People said the exact same thing about the Baltic states after WWII that you are saying about Crimea now, so I don't see why we should accept that "Crimea is now part of Russia and that isn't going to change". I'm not the one who calls the federalism of the USSR and Russia "fake federalism", that's Matt Y and his Russian correspondents. Matt conspicuously uses "fake federalism" in his post. Your beef is with him.
Well, you do not 'know that you . . . want to erase Crimean Tatars from history', because you do not know me or anything about me, I do not want to do such a thing, and my post did not even mention Crimean Tatars. I would prefer it if you stopped slandering me on the basis of literally nothing at all, it's very poor form.
The Russians aren't all bad. Why, at the Sochi Olympics, the Russians built a wonderful ice palace for only Canadians to win gold medals in. Thanks dudes.
While your conclusion about not invading the Ukraine is sound your analysis has some very grievous errors. Casting Russia's point of view as legitimate against Western and principally American opposition and intransigence is not very astute. Russia just isn't the great power they once were. But they want to be treated as if they were. I suppose you could characterize what they did in Syria as just normal stuff. It wasn't. Not were any of the online shenanigans and political operations they have engaged in since the fall of the Soviet Union.
Syria was not even a tactical military success for the Russians. But it was a great political success. In a place where they had exactly zero economic interests and at significant cost they managed to kill hundreds of thousands of civilians by proxy and even more importantly drive millions of Syrians of refugees into the West and elsewhere. While at the same time fostering nativist anti-immigrant sentiment in the west to such a degree that they got the British to Brexit. And foster dissent throughout the EU leading to the rise of nationalist and ultra-nationalist right wing parties. Quite the political and intelligence coup that was. ( Parenthetically war mongering Hillary Clinton was absolutely right. The key to preventing that Syrian fiasco was establishing safe zones and both military and economic aid so those Syrians did not have to flee their own country.)
I believe the lesson was learned. So no, Putin will not be allowed to this in the Ukraine. Which rather means support for the Ukraine cannot just be limited to dumping in weapons while Russia creates another refugee crisis that will dwarf what happened in Syria. That cannot be allowed to happen. Which rather implies a very large safe zone within Ukraine. And that is where the military action will take place should Russia attempt a large scale invasion.
What troubles me most about your assessment is the casual disregard for the lives at stake. Makes me wonder what you have planned for Canada. I mean if the Russians are entitled to vassal states....
Language like "can't be allowed to happen" implies a level of binary action that I just don't think contributes to the conversation. Counties respond to each others' actions, but there are obviously limits to their ability to *control* each other.
There are responses that the United States theoretically could take, but never would. I will assume for the sake of argument that you would not be in favor of an all-out nuclear strike on Russia if their tanks rolled down the street in Kyiv. So you're certainly willing to "allow" the Russians to invade and conquer Ukraine.
As the apocryphal Churchill quote goes, now we're just haggling over the price.
I think it would be perfectly reasonable and not difficult to screw up the Russian economy should they invade the parts of the Ukraine they haven't. You know who also knows this? The Russians. And I am not willing to allow the Russians to do any such thing as invade.
That's not what "allow" means, though. That's "we should make the consequences [economic or otherwise] so severe that the Russians have absolutely no interest in paying the price for invasion". And I fully agree with the latter sentiment.
To wit: the framing of "how could the US have allowed Russia to invade Ukraine?" is only a hop, skip, and a jump away from "how could the US have left Afghanistan without fixing it?"
It's amazing to me that Matt can write this column without a word about China/Taiwan, which is a key strategic reason that it's important to reassert the inviolability of national sovereignty and to work out the details of a potent sanctions regime. Similarly, Matt makes no mention of the impact of a Russian invasion on the Baltics, Poland and other former-Soviet bloc states.
This criticism is certainly fair, but I think the article still articulates some key ideas. It's important for Putin to understand that it really is the principle of the issue. Which is why there won't be a big reward for Putin for not invading (he's not actually holding the west hostage), but there will be penalties for doing so. At the same time, western leaders probably should look for a way to help Putin save face backing down, because that is a win-win outcome. Ukraine making a statement about NATO membership might be enough.
4th to last paragraph
The article mentions gas supply to Europe in passing, but it is worth noting that a) gas supplies and pipelines are being used as a political tool, b) current gas in storage in Europe appears to be historically low as a result of deliberate actions starting last year, c) gas exports are an important source of revenue for Russia, d) gas is most profitably sold by pipeline to nearby customers.
It is not hard to imagine a sequence of events where Russia cuts off gas temporarily (at small cost to itself) and sets in motion a sequence of events that results in permanent damage to its gas exports (tens of billions in lost exports) by prodding the EU towards energy independence at a much accelerated pace.
"Back when counterinsurgency was a hot topic in the mid-aughts, a lot of leading experts said that a successful occupation requires one occupying soldier for every 40 civilians in the occupied country. I’m not sure that’s right, but among people who don’t think occupations are inevitably doomed, it seems to be the leading theory as to why they fail so frequently. "
The Ukraine has been successfully occupied by Poland and Russia since at least the 19th century. I don't think an occupation would be difficult at all.
My understanding is that those occupations took place before the advent of Ukrainian nationalism and were made much easier because of it. In general, colonial-era occupations seem to have been much less costly to the occupiers than nationalism-era occupations. Matt mentioned the costliness of the Iraq War, for example, but it's worth remembering that the Ottoman Turks conquered and occupied Arab Mesopotamia pretty sustainably for centuries before Arab nationalism began to develop.
The claim is that in the 19th century, occupations were possible, but by the late 20th century they haven't been. Technology has improved the ability to resist more than the ability to pacify.
Weapons technology is a big part of it but another big part of it is information technology. In the 19th century and earlier, when there was little mass media and most people couldn't read, people knew they were being oppressed mainly through witnessing it in person or hearing word of mouth. Since the 20th century, most people have been able to read about it or hear it on the radio. It also made it much easier to spread romantic ideas about national identity and what not.